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Abstract
This paper presents FIR-GEM: Fiscal IRish General Equilibrium Model. FIR-GEM is a small
open economy DSGE model designed as scal toolkit for scal policy analysis in Ireland. To illustrate
the models potential for scal policy analysis, we conduct three types of experiments. First, we analyse
the scal transmission mechanism through which Irish scal policy a¤ects the Irish economy. Second,
we compute scal multipliers for the main tax-spending instruments, namely government consumption,
public investment, public wage bill, public transfers, consumption, labour and capital tax. We focus on
a scal policy stimulus that is either implemented through spending increases or tax cuts. Third, we
perform robustness analysis on key structural characteristics that can a¤ect quantitatively the size of scal
multipliers. We nd that the size of scal multipliers in the Irish economy heavily depends on its degree of
openness, the method of scal nancing employed, the elasticity of the sovereign risk premia to Irish debt
dynamics and the exibility of Irish labour and product markets.
Keywords: Fiscal policy, DSGE, Ireland, Openness.
JEL classication: E62, F41, F42
aAcknowledgements: FIR-GEM was developed as part of the joint research programme "Macroeconomy, Taxation and
Banking" between the ESRI, the Department of Finance and Revenue Commissioners and I am grateful for helpful comments
of the programme steering committee. I would like to especially thank Alan Barrett, Martina Lawless, Campbell Leith, Kieran
McQuinn, Dimitris Papageorgiou and Apostolis Philippopoulos for many helpful suggestions and comments. I would also like to
thank Adele Bergin, Abian Garcia-Rodriguez, Stelios Gogos, Ilias Kostarakos, Conor OToole and participants at the Quarterly
Macro Meet up at the ESRI for useful comments. Any errors and the views expressed in this paper are my own.
bEconomic and Social Research Institute, Economic Analysis, Whitaker Square, Sir Rogersons Quay, Dublin 2, Ireland.
Email: petros.varthalitis@esri.ie.
1
1 Introduction
FIR-GEM: Fiscal IRish General Equilibrium Model is a small open economy dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model (SOE-DSGE) that attempts to capture the main features of the Irish economy. The primary
aim of FIR-GEM is to serve as a scal policy toolkit for scal policy analysis in Ireland. The present model
belongs to the class of medium-scale DSGE models that are widely used in policy institutions1 . These models
are based on microeconomic foundations and economic agents intertemporal choice. The general equilibrium
framework captures the interaction between policy actions and private agents economic behaviour. These
features are vital for scal policy analysis. Fiscal policymaking can utilize a rich menu of tax and spending
instruments that could result in a wide range of macroeconomic outcomes. Fiscal actions do not only a¤ect
private agentscurrent economic decisions but their economic behaviour over time (intertemporal choices) by
inuencing their expectations about future scal policy. This makes scal policy analysis a complex task (see
Leeper (2010)). To evaluate and rank alternative scal policies, research economists should take into account
an explicit analysis of the structure of the economy, private agents expectations and the dynamic adjustment
of their economic behaviour to those scal policies2 .
In addition, any macroeconomic and scal policy analysis should take into account the specic structure
of the Irish economy3 . In the next paragraphs, we summarize some structural characteristics of the Irish
economy that the present model is designed to capture.
First, a key structural characteristic of Ireland is its exceptional degree of openness4 . Irelands openness
is reected in a number of key macroeconomic aggregates. In particular, the larger size of the Irish tradable
sector5 vis-à-vis the non-tradable sector. For example, the ratio of the value added in the tradable sector
to the value added in both sectors averages 59% over the period 2001 to 2014. Moreover, the Irish tradable
1For example European Commission DG ECFIN uses the Quest III model, see Ratto, Roeger, and in t Veld (2009) and the
Global Multi-Country Model (GM), see Albonico et al. (2017). The ECB uses the New Area Wide Model (NAWM), see Warne,
Coenen, and Christo¤el (2008) and Coenen et al. (2018). While several european countries have developped DSGE models, e.g.
REMS, see Bosca et al. (2010) , and FiMOD for Spain, see Stahler and Thomas (2012), BoGGEM for Greece, see Papageorgiou
(2014), GEAR for Germany see Gadatsch et al. (2015), AINO 2.0 see Kilponen et al. (2016) and many others.
2For a thorough discussion on the current state and role of DSGE models in policymaking see Gurkaynak and Tille (2017),
Reis (2017) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2018).
3Papers focusing on various aspects of the Irish economy over time include FitzGerald (2000), Honohan and Walsh (2002),
Lane (2009), Whelan (2014), Fitzgerald (2018).
4On the role of openness see CESifo (2014), Fitzgerald (2014) and McQuinn and Varthalitis (2018).
5The Irish tradable sector is dominated by foreign a¢ liated rms (Multinational Enterpirses), this is reected in the sector
specicity and export-orientation of the tradable sector in our model.
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sector is highly export-oriented6 , for example the exports to GDP ratio averages 96% between 2001 and 20147 .
Domestic consumption and production heavily rely on imports while the Irish trade surplus averages 14% as a
share of GDP over the period 2001 to 2014. In order to capture these characteristics of the Irish economy, we
incorporate two sectors of domestic private production, i.e. we distinguish between the tradable and the non-
tradable sectors. The factors of production are sector specic while sectoral reallocation entails production
costs (as in Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe (2017)).
Second, Ireland is modelled as a small open economy participating in a currency union (Eurozone). This
implies that households and government can participate in global nancial and capital markets but their
behaviour cannot inuence the world interest rate8 . As a result, we follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) and
assume that the nominal interest rate faced by domestic residents in the world nancial markets is an increasing
function of the deviation of the Irish public debt to GDP ratio from a threshold level (for similar modelling
see Garcia-Cicco, Pancrazi, and Uribe (2010) and Philippopoulos, Varthalitis, and Vassilatos (2017)). This
assumption is empirically relevant and has non trivial implications for the e¢ cacy of scal policy. Being a
member of the Eurozone implies the loss of monetary independence and a xed nominal exchange rate regime
for the Irish economy. Thus the only macroeconomic policy tool available is scal policy.
Third, Irish scal policy over the period 2001 to 2014 is characterized by relatively low automatic stabiliz-
ers.9 Indicatively, government expenditures and tax revenues as shares of GDP are among the lowest within
Eurozone countries, they amount to 38% and 34%10 of GDP between 2001 and 2014.11 The present model
incorporates a rich menu of scal policy instruments. In particular, the Government has four spending instru-
ments at its disposal, namely government consumption, public investment, public wages and agent-specic
public transfers and three tax instruments, namely consumption, labour and capital taxes. In addition, the
Government can issue domestic and foreign public debt (along with taxes levied on households) which are
6For more details on the composition of the Irish tradable sector see Barry and Bergin (2012) and Barry and Bergin (2018).
7Although this gure reduces to 52% in value added terms for 2001-2011, it still highlights the importance of exports in the
Irish economy.
8As is well known, a small open economy with an exogenous world interest rate induces non-stationary dynamics.
9For e.g. Kostarakos and Varthalitis (2019) compare e¤ective tax rates in Ireland with Eurozone average and nd that Irish
ETRs rank amongst the lowest.
10We also express Irish scal aggregates as GNI shares, since GDP and GNI di¤er by 15% on average over 2001-2014. Although
the gap between Eurozone averages and Ireland closes, Irish scal aggregates remain amongst the lowest within Eurozone countries.
For example government expenditures and tax revenues amount to 45% and 39% in Ireland while Eurozone averages are 48% and
45% respectively.
11 Ireland recently implemented a front-loaded scal consolidation package via mostly expenditure cuts (for more details on the
Irish scal consolidation see McCarthy (2015) and Larch et al. (2016)). Irish public debt to GDP ratio peaked to 120% in 2012,
but post 2014 Ireland succeeded in stabilizing domestic public nances and restoring access to international nancial markets.
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used to nance public expenditures. We adopt a rule-like approach to policy in that scal policy is conducted
via simple and implementable scal policy rules.12 Here, all the main tax-spending instruments are allowed
to react to the public debt to GDP ratio and the level of the decit so as to ensure scal sustainability.13 In
addition, a rm in the public sector utilizes goods purchased from the private sector, public employment and
public capital to produce a good that provides both welfare-enhancing and productivity-enhancing services.14
Fourth, we incorporate in the model several features that quantitatitavely matter for the scal transmission
mechanism and are empirically relevant (see e.g. in Zubairy (2014) and in Leeper, Traum, and Walker (2017)).
Namely households with non-Ricardian behaviour (as in e.g. Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007)), real
frictions and nominal rigidities, while, we allow for complementarity/subsitutability between private/public
consumption and productivity-enhancing public goods.
We calibrate the model using Irish annual data over the period 2001-201415 . To illustrate the models
ability to assess scal policy, we conduct three types of simulations. First, we use the model to examine the
scal transmission mechanism through which Irish scal policy a¤ects the Irish economy. Second, we compute
scal multipliers for the main tax-spending instruments, namely government consumption, public investment,
public wage bill, public transfers, consumption, labour and capital tax. We focus on a scal stimulus policy
that is either implemented through spending increases or tax cuts. Third, we perform robustness analysis on
structural characteristics that can a¤ect qualitatively and quantitatively the size of scal multipliers in the
Irish case. These include the degree of openness, alternative scal nancing methods, the sensitivity of the
international nominal rate at which Ireland borrows from the rest of the world to Irish public debt dynamics,
complementarity/subsitutability of public and private consumption, exibility of the Irish labour and product
markets.
The main results are as follows: rst Irish scal multipliers are expected to be smaller in magnitude than
most EU countries due to the degree of openness of the domestic economy and the large inuence of the
tradable sector. Second scal policy a¤ects the composition of aggregate output. The scal stimulus works
12 In Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005) and (2007) simple and implementablemeans that policy can easily and e¤ectively
be communicated to the public; that is policy instruments react to a small number of easily observed macroeconomic indicators.
13Most European countries set their policy by following some type of scal rules so this is an empirically relevant assumption
(see European Commission 2012).
14For DSGE models that incorporate a public production function see e.g. Forni et al. (2010), Papageorgiou (2014), Economides
et al. (2013) and (2017).
15We focus over the period 2001-2014 since there are well documented problems with Irish national accounts after 2014 for
more details see Fitzgerald (2018).
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solely through the non-tradable sector while the tradable sector remains una¤ected or contracts in size. The
latter is crucial in the Irish case where the tradable sector is signicantly larger than the non-tradable sector.
Third a scal stimulus via spending produces more output than a stimulus via tax cuts in the short run;
that is spending multipliers are consistently larger than tax multipliers. Fourth, in terms of the e¤ect on
GDP in the rst year, the most e¤ective Irish scal instruments are as follows: public investment, government
consumption, consumption taxes, capital taxes, public transfers, public wages and, nally, labour taxes. Fifth,
a scal expansion via spending is expected to have a negative e¤ect on the competitiveness of the domestic
economy. Our results show a deterioration of the Irish external balance in the early years of the stimulus era;
that is the scal stimulus is likely to crowd out exports and at the same time crowd in imports. Sixth, income
tax cuts induce a smaller e¤ect on the Irish external balance. Capital and labour tax cuts are expected to
reduce production costs and prices in Ireland vis-à-vis the rest of the world leading to an improvement in
the competitiveness of the Irish economy. As such, a scal expansion via tax cuts induces supply-side e¤ects
that take time to materialize (i.e. multipliers are smaller in the short run) but their e¤ects are long lasting.
Seventh, the method of scal nancing is crucial for the e¢ cacy of a scal stimulus. A spending stimulus
nanced via tax increases mitigates the positive e¤ect on GDP.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 solves the
model. Section 4 develops the calibration strategy and presents the steady state solution. Section 5 analyses
the scal transmission mechanism of the model. Section 6 quanties scal multipliers in the Irish case. Section
7 conducts a robustness analysis, while Section 8 concludes and discusses possible avenues for future research.
An appendix presents details of the model.
2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature on medium scale SOE-DSGE models for scal policy analysis in
policy institutions. Our work emphasizes the role played by the degree of openness in the scal transmission
mechanism in Ireland and quanties scal multipliers for the main tax-spending Irish scal instruments. There
are three papers that quantify scal multpliers for Ireland, in particular, Clancy, Jacquinot, and Lozej (2016)
compute the government consumption and investment multiplier for Ireland and Slovenia using a global DSGE
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model (EAGLE), Bergin and Garcia-Rodriguez (2019) use the ESRI COSMO large-scale macroeconometric
model16 to compute scal multipliers for tax-spending Irish scal instruments and Ivory, Casey, and Conroy
(2019) estimate spending multipliers using a suite of VAR-type models. To the best of our knowledge this is the
rst paper that quanties all the main tax-spending multipliers for Ireland using a medium scale SOE-DSGE
model with a rich scal sector, analyses the associated scal transmission mechanism, provides an Irish scal
instrument ranking with respect to their e¤ect in the Irish GDP and computes the e¤ects of scal policy on
the composition of aggregate output and the competitiveness of the Irish economy.
DSGE models for Ireland17 include EIRE Mod, see Clancy and Merola (2016b), which however does not
incorporate an explicit scal sector. Klein and Ventura (2018) develop a growth model for Ireland to study
the Irelands remarkable historical economic performance over 1980-2005 focusing on the role of scal policy
while Ahearne, Kydland, and Wynne (2006) study Irelands depression episode over the period from 1973 to
1985.
This paper also contributes to the vast literature on scal multipliers using DSGE models by quantifying
scal multipliers in Ireland for the main tax-spending instruments18 . For example, a similar study, Kilponen
et al. (2015), compare tax-spending multipliers across fourteen countries in Europe. Our contribution also
lies in the eld of scal policy e¤ects on the trade balance and the composition of output, e.g. Monacelli and
Perotti (2008) and Monacelli and Perotti (2010) study the e¤ect of government spending on trade balance and
international relative prices19 .
16Bergin et al. (2017) develop a large-scale macroeconometric model estimated for Ireland in the spirit of NiGEM model
developed by National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
17Clancy and Merola (2016a) and Lozej, Onorante, and Rannenberg (2018) develop SOE-DSGE models with nancial frictions
for Ireland focusing on macroprudential policies.
18The literature on scal multipliers is volunimous for a detailed review see Battini et al. (2014) and the references therein. Some
selective references are: Coenen, Straub, and Trabandt (2013) use a suite of DSGE models to compute multipliers, Leeper, Traum,
and Walker (2017) use bayesian techniques to quantify the size of multipliers across di¤erent model specications, Zubairy (2014)
and Drautzburg and Uhlig (2015) use estimated models to compute scal multipliers for U.S economy. Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo (2011) compute spending multipliers when the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate binds, while Canzoneri,
Collard, Dellas, and Diba (2016) nd assymetric multipliers over the business cycle.
19Our results for Ireland with the remarkable degree of openness conrm empirical studies, like Benetrix and Lane (2010) and
Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013), that scal multipliers in open economies are smaller than in closed economies.
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3 A Small Open Economy Model
3.1 Informal description of the model
This section develops a small open economy dynamic general equilibrium model (SOE-DSGE) with a rich
scal sector calibrated for Ireland. This model is designed as a scal policy toolkit for Ireland, and thus
contains several key features seeking to resemble the structure of the Irish economy and, hence, be suitable
for scal policy analysis. The model: (a) distinguishes between tradable and non-tradable production sectors;
(b) allows for sector-specicity of factor inputs; (c) incorporates heterogeneous agents; (d) empirically relevant
nominal and real frictions; (e) debt-elastic interest rate; (f) delegated monetary policy (Ireland is a member of
a currency union) and independent national scal authority and (g) it allows for an explicit scal sector with
a rich menu of spending-tax scal instruments, explicit scal rules and a public production function.
This model belongs to the class of small open economies and thus incorporates several open economy
features. In particular, households and government can participate in international nancial markets. To
ensure stationarity we assume that the international interest faced by domestic borrowers is debt elastic, as in
e.g. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003). Moreover, domestic economic agents can engage in international trade,
thus they can consume and invest in imports; while a share of domestic production is exported to the rest of
the world.
The model consists of three types of economic agents: households, rms and a government. We inco-
prorate two type of households; rst, forward-looking optimizing agents which have access to domestic and
international nancial and capital markets while receiving dividends from domestic rms. These households
are referred to as Ricardians or Savers. Second, nancially constrained agents which do not have access to
nancial and capital markets, that is they live hand to mouth and each period consume all of their after tax
disposable income. These households are referred to as non-Ricardians or non-Savers. The introduction of the
latter type of households in the model has non trivial e¤ects in the transmission mechanism of scal policy
actions (see e.g. Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007), Cespedes, Fornero, and Gali (2011) and Leeper, Traum,
and Walker (2017)). Non-Savers are relatively more prone to changes in government expenditures or/and taxes
since they cannot smooth out changes in their disposable income over time. Both type of households provide
labour services to the three sectors of the economy, namely tradable, non-tradable and public sectors while
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they optimally allocate hours worked among these sectors. Both types of households pay consumption taxes
and receive household-specic public transfers, Ricardians pay labour and income taxes while non-Ricardians
pay only labour taxes.
The model incorporates private and public production. There are two stages of private production. In
the nal stage, the nal good, that is used for private and public consumption and investment, is produced.
There are two rms namely a nal good and a composite tradable good producer at this level. The nal good
producer utilizes the composite tradable and the intermediate non-tradable good to produce the nal good.
Similarly, the composite tradable good producer utilizes the home produced tradable good and the imported
good to produce the composite tradable good.
In the intermediate stage, the intermediate tradable and non-tradable bundles are produced. There are
N i intermediate non-tradable rms. Each non-tradable rm indexed by i hires labour and rents physical
capital from households to produce a di¤erentiated variety i: A non-tradable distributor combines all varieties,
i = 1::N i; into an intermediate non-tradable bundle. Similarly, there are N j intermediate home tradable rms.
Each home tradable rm indexed by j hires labour and rents physical capital from households to produce a
di¤erentiated variety j: A tradable distributor combines all varieties, j = 1::N j ; into an intermediate home
tradable bundle.
Firms in the public sector use goods purchased from the private sector, public employment and public
capital to produce a good that provides both utility-enhancing and productivity-enhancing services. The
associated public spending inputs are set exogenously by the government.
In terms of economic policy, Ireland is a member of the Eurozone thus we focus on a monetary policy
regime in which the nominal exchange rate is xed and there is no monetary policy independence (this mimics
membership in a currency union). Fiscal policy is conducted via simple scal policy rules.
3.2 Households
The economy is populated byN number of households. The population is comprised of two types of households,
Ricardian households (or Savers) indexed by the upperscript r = 1::Nr and non-Ricardians (or Non Savers)
indexed by the upperscript nr = 1::Nnr where Nr +Nnr = N:
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3.2.1 Ricardian Households (Savers)
Preferences and Constraints There are Nr Ricardians/Savers indexed by the upperscript r = 1::Nrt :
Each household r maximizes its expected discounted lifetime utility, V r0 ; in any given period t :
V r0  E0
1X
t=0
tUr
ecrt ; lH;rt ; lNT;rt ; lP;rt  (1)
where ecrt  crt +#gygt denotes composite consumption comprising of crt consumption of the nal good (dened
in section 3.3.1 below) and ygt consumption of public good per capita produced by a state rm (dened
in section 3.4.2), #g > (<) 0, measures the degree of subsitutability (complementarity) between public and
private consumption, lH;rt , l
NT;r
t and l
P;r
t denote hours of work in the tradable, non-tradable and public
sectors20 respectively, 0 <  < 1 is a subjective discount factor and E0 is the rational expectations operator
conditional on information at time 0. Each households sequential budget constraint in period t is given by
(in nominal terms):
Pt (1 + 
c
t) c
r
t + Ptx
H;r
t + Ptx
NT;r
t + Ptb
r
t + StP

t f
r
t + 
 (frt ; f
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= (1  nt )Pt

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H;r
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NT
t l
NT;r
t + w
P
t l
P;r
t

+
 
1  kt

Pt

rNT;rt k
NT;r
t 1 + !
NT;r
t

+
 
1  kt

Pt

rH;kt k
H;r
t 1 + !
H;r
t

+Rt 1Pt 1brt 1 +Qt 1StP

t 1f
r
t 1   Pt l;rt
(2)
where Pt is the nominal price of the nal good, l
j;r
t ; x
j;r
t ; k
j;r
t ; r
j;k
t ; w
j;r
t and !
j;r
t are hours worked, gross invest-
ment, the beginning-of-period physical capital, the real return of capital, real wage rate and real prots in sector
j = H;NT , wpt denotes public wages, b
r
t and f
r
t are the real value of the end-of-period domestic government
bonds and internationally traded assets (the latter is expressed in foreign currency) respectively21 , St is the
nominal exchange rate dened as the domestic currency price of one unit of foreign currency, Rt 1; Qt 1  1
denote the gross nominal return of domestic government bonds and international assets between t   1 and
t respectively;  ct ; 
n
t ; 
k
t are consumption, labour and capital tax rates respectively, 
l;r
t is public transfers
20Our modelling implies that each household is comprised of many members which can be employed in all three sectors.
Then, each household allocates its members to each sector by maximizing its lifetime utility, for similar modelling see Uribe
and Schmitt-Grohe (2017). See Ardagna (2001), Forni, Gerali, and Pisani (2010), Economides, Papageorgiou, Philippopoulos,
and Vassilatos (2013) and Papageorgiou (2014), Economides, Papageorgiou, and Philippopoulos (2017) for models which include
public employment.
21For simplicity and notational convenience and without loss of generality, all quantities and relative prices will be expressed
in terms of the nal good as in Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe (2017).
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targeted to Ricardian household r. Finally, borrowing on the international market entails an adjustment cost
 (:). The laws of motion for physical capital in tradable and non-tradable sectors are given by:
kH;rt =

1  H

kH;rt 1 + x
H;r
t   H

kH;rt ; k
H;r
t 1

(3)
kNT;rt =

1  NT

kNT;rt 1 + x
NT;r
t   NT

kNT;rt ; k
NT;r
t 1

(4)
where H and NT ; H (:) and NT (:) are sector specic depreciation rates and adjustment costs respectively.
Functional forms of the period utility and the adjustment costs are specied in Appendix G.
A key element of the Irish macroeconomic structure is the presence of two distinct sectors of production,
i.e. the tradable and non-tradable sector. Both have di¤erent structural characteristics. We allow for sector
specicity by including features that aim to slow down the sectoral re-allocation of factors of production,
i.e. labour and physical capital (as in e.g. Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe (2017)). To do this, we, rst, allow
for imperfect substitutability of labour across di¤erent sectors by introducing sector-specic hours worked as
separate arguments in the utility function. Second, we allow for sector-specic depreciation rates and capital
adjustment costs in the associated laws of motion (3) and (4). Both elements imply that factor movements
among sectors entails costs; the magnitude of these costs are calibrated to reect the relevant Irish data.
Choice of allocations Each household r maximizes its lifetime utility (1) in any given period t by choosing
purchases of the nal consumption good, crt ; hours of work in the tradable, l
H;r
t ; non-tradable sector, l
NT;r
t ,
and public sector, lP;rt ; the end-of-period physical capital stocks, k
H;r
t ; and k
NT;r
t ; the end-of-period holdings
of domestic government bond, brt ; and international traded assets expressed in foreign currency, f
r
t ; subject
to the constraint (2) (in which we incorporate constraints (3) and (4)). The Lagrange multiplier associated
with constraint (2) is rt . The rst-order conditions with respect to c
r
t ; l
H;r
t ; l
NT;r
t ; l
P;r
t ; k
H;r
t ; k
NT;r
t ; b
r
t and f
r
t
are given by:
@Urt
@crt
= rt (1 + 
c
t) (5)
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3.2.2 Non-Ricardian Households (Non-savers)
In line with the empirical evidence see e.g. in Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007), Cespedes, Fornero,
and Gali (2011) and Leeper, Traum, and Walker (2017), we incorporate a fraction of nancially constrained
households which we refer to as non-Ricardian households or non-Savers.
Preferences and Constraints Each non-Ricardian household nr has the same preferences as Ricardian
households and chooses cnrt ; l
T;nr
t ; l
NT;nr
t and l
P;nr
t to maximize its expected discounted lifetime utility, V
nr
0 :
V nr0  E0
1X
t=0
tU
ecnrt ; lH;nrt ; lNT;nrt ; lP;nrt  (13)
subject to the sequential budget constraint in period t (in nominal terms):
(1 +  ct)Ptc
nr
t = (1  nt )Pt

wHt l
H;nr
t + w
NT
t l
NT;nr
t + w
P
t l
P;nr
t

  Pt l;nrt (14)
Non-Ricardian households (non-Savers) receive income from working in the tradable, non-tradable and
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public sectors; but they have no access to capital or/and nancial markets. In other words, they live hand-to-
mouth and consume their after tax labour income plus targeted government lump-sum transfers, Pt
l;nr
t < 0:
Choice of allocations Each household nr maximizes its lifetime utility (13) in any given period t by
choosing purchases of the nal good, cnrt ; hours of work in the tradable, l
H;nr
t ; non-tradable sector, l
NT;nr
t ; and
public sector, lP;nrt subject to the constraint (14). The Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (14) is
nrt . The rst-order conditions with respect to c
nr
t ; l
H;nr
t ; l
NT;nr
t ; l
P;nr
t are:
@Unrt
@cnrt
= nrt (1 + 
c
t) (15)
  @U
nr
t
@lH;nrt
= nrt (1  nt )wHt (16)
  @U
nr
t
@lNT;nrt
= nrt (1  nt )wNTt (17)
  @U
nr
t
@lP;nrt
= nrt (1  nt )wPt (18)
3.3 Firms
There are two stages of private production. In the nal stage, the nal good that is used for private and public
consumption and investment is produced. There are two rms namely a nal good and a composite tradable
good producer (the associated problems are solved in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2). The nal good producer utilizes
the composite tradable and the single intermediate non-tradable good to produce the nal good. Similarly,
the composite tradable good producer utilizes the home produced tradable good and the imported good to
produce the composite tradable good.
In the intermediate stage, the intermediate non-tradable and tradable bundles are produced (the associated
problems are solved in sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4). There are N i intermediate non-tradable rms, each non-
tradable rm indexed by i hires labour and rents physical capital from households to produce a di¤erianted
variety i: A non-tradable distributor combines all varieties, i = 1::N i; into an intermediate non-tradable
bundle. Similarly, there are N j intermediate home tradable rms, each home tradable rm indexed by j hires
labour and rents physical capital from households to produce a di¤erianted variety j: A tradable distributor
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combines all varieties, j = 1::N j ; into an intermediate home tradable bundle.
3.3.1 Final good producer
In this section, we solve the problem of the nal good producer in per capita terms22 . The nal good is
produced using a non-tradable good, yNTt , and a composite tradable good, y
T
t ; via a CES technology:
yt =

(v)
1

 
yTt
  1
 + (1  v) 1  yNTt   1   1 (19)
where  is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the composite tradable good and the non-
tradable good, and v 2 (0; 1] is a share parameter governing the share of the composite tradable input and the
non-tradable input in the production of the nal good. The producer of the nal good behaves competitively
and maximizes its prots given by:
Ptyt   PTt yTt   PNTt yNTt
demand functions for the composite tradable good and the non-tradable good are given by:
@yt
@yTt
=
PTt
Pt
(20)
@yt
@yNTt
=
PNTt
Pt
(21)
Combining (20) and (21) yields:
yTt =
v
1  v

PTt
PNTt
 
yNTt (22)
while the associated price index is:
Pt =
h
v
 
PTt
1 
+ (1  v)  PNTt 1 i 11  (23)
22Notice that throughout the paper small case letters denote per capita (rm) quantitities, zt  ZtN ; while capital case letters
denote, Zt; aggregate quantities unless otherwise stated.
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3.3.2 Composite tradable good producer
The composite tradable good is produced using the domestic absorption of the home tradable good, yH;dt , and
an imported good, yFt ; via a CES technology:
yTt =
" 
vH
 1
H

yH;dt
 H 1
H
+
 
1  vH 1H  yFt  H 1H
# H
H 1
(24)
where H is the intratemporal elasticity of subsitution between the domestic absorption of home tradable good
and the imported good and vH 2 (0; 1] denotes a share parameter that determines the share of the domestic
absortpion of the home tradable good vis-à-vis the imported good. Also it determines implicitly, the share of
the home tradable good which is exported to the rest of the world. This parameter can capture key features
of the Irish economy like the export orientation of home tradable production and the share of imported inputs
in the production of the composite and the nal good. The producer of the composite tradable good behaves
competitively and maximizes its prots given by:
PTt y
T
t   PHt yHt   PFt yFt
demand functions for the domestic tradable good and imported good are given by:
@yTt
@yHt
=
PHt
PTt
(25)
@yt
@yNTt
=
PFt
PTt
(26)
Combining (25) and (26) yields:
yH;dt =
vH
1  vH

PHt
PFt
 H
yFt (27)
while the associated price index is:
PTt =

vH
 
PHt
1 H
+
 
1  vH  PFt 1 H 11 H (28)
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where
PFt = StP

t (29)
In the next two subsections we explain how the tradable and non-tradable goods are produced.
3.3.3 Non-tradable sector
Non-tradable good distributor A non-tradable good distributor combines varieties, i = 1::N i; of the
intermediate non-tradable goods, yNT;it , into a composite non-tradable good, Y
NT
t ; using a Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregator:
Y NTt 
0@ NiX
i=1

yNT;it
 "NT 1
"NT
1A "
NT
"NT 1
where Y NTt and y
NT
t  Y
NT
t
N denote aggregate and per capita quantity respectively, "
NT > 0 is the elasticity
of substitution across goods i . The non-tradable good distributor maximizes its prots by choosing, Y NTt ;
while taking prices, PNTt and P
NT;i
t ; as given:
PNTt Y
NT
t  
NiX
i=1
PNT;it y
NT;i
t
The optimality condition yields a downward slopping demand function for each intermediate good of variety
i :
yNT;it =
"
PNT;it
PNTt
# "NT
yNTt
where the associated price index is PNTt 
PNi
i=1

PNT;it
1 "NT 11 "NT
:
Intermediate non-tradable goods rms There are N i intermediate non-tradable good rms indexed by
the upperscript i: Each intermediate non-tradable good rm i supplies variety i by solving a two-step problem.
First, intermediate rm i minimizes its cost by choosing its factor inputs kNT;it 1 and l
NT;i
t :
	

yNT;it

= min
fkNT;it 1 ;lNT;it g
n
Ptr
k
t k
NT;i
t 1 + Ptw
NT
t l
NT;i
t
o
taking prices as given and subject to the production function:
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yNT;it = A
NT
t fygt g{
NT
1

kNT;it 1
aNT 
lNT;it
1 aNT{NT2
(30)
Each intermediate non-tradable good rm i produces a di¤erentiated product i utilising as inputs, ygt ; per
rm public good (see section 3.4.2) which is used as an intermediate input in the private production, kNT;it 1 ;
physical capital rented from households in fully competitive capital markets and labour services rented from
households, lNT;it ; in fully competitive labour markets.
23 ANTt is a scale parameter that measures productivity
in the non-tradable sector. {NT1 > 0 is a parameter that determines the share of the public good as an
intermediate productive input, {NT2 2 [0; 1] determines the share of private productive inputs.24 While aNT
and 1  aNT are structural parameters related to capital and labour income share in the non-tradable sector.
The rst order conditions are given by (where NT;it is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (30)):
Ptr
k
t = 
NT;i
t a
NT{NT2
yNT;it
kNT;it 1
(31)
Ptw
NT
t = 
NT;i
t
 
1  aNT {NT2 yNT;it
lNT;it
(32)
Plugging the conditional factor demands into the nominal cost function we get the minimum nominal cost
function for any given level of production, 	

yNT;it

: It can be shown that the associated Lagrange multiplier
is equal to the nominal marginal cost NT;it =
@	(yNT;it )
@yNT;it
: Nominal prots of rm i can be written as:
Pt!
NT;i
t = P
NT;i
t y
NT;i
t   Ptrkt kNT;it 1   PtwNTt lNT;it  
NT
2
 
PNT;it
PNT;it 1
  1
!2
PNTt y
NT
t (33)
In the second step, each rm i chooses its price, PNT;it ; to maximize its nominal prots facing Rotemberg-type
23Labour markets in Ireland are generally acknowledged as being among the most exible in OECD countries (see McQuinn
and Varthalitis (2018) for a comparison of Ireland labour market exibility indicators with OECD and EU averages) and Babecky
et al. (2010) for a comparison of wage rigidities across European countries. In addition, Ireland has a Social partnership model
that promotes coordination in wage setting. This coordination approach enables wages to adjust to economy wide shocks. Thus,
in the present model we assume perfectly competitive labour markets while we abstract from any form of nominal or real wage
rigidity.
24 In the benchmark calibration, we set {NT2 = 1; which yields a production function à la Baxter and King (1993),
yNT;it = A
NT
t

ygt
	{NT1 kNT;it 1 aNT lNT;it 1 aNT :When we set {NT2 = 1 {NT1 we allow for complementarity between public
and private factor inputs.
16
nominal rigidities (as in e.g. Bi et al. (2013)):
max
PNT;it
1X
t=0
E00;t
8<:PNT;it yNT;it  	yNT;it   NT2
 
PNT;it
PNT;it 1
  1
!2
PNTt y
NT
t
9=;
subject to demand for each variety i:
yNT;it =
"
PNT;it
PNTt
# "NT
yNTt
After imposing symmetry, i.e. yNTt = y
NT;i
t and P
NT;i
t = P
NT
t the prot maximizing condition yields:
n 
1  "NT  pNTt yNTt + "NT 0NT yNTt o
 NT

pNTt
pNTt 1
Pt
Pt 1
  1

pNTt y
NT
t
pNTt
pNTt 1
Pt
Pt 1
+ 
rt+1
rt
Pt
Pt+1
n
NT

pNTt+1
pNTt
Pt+1
Pt
  1

pNTt+1y
NT
t+1
pNTt+1
pNTt
Pt+1
Pt
o
= 0
(34)
where  
0NT denotes real marginal cost.
3.3.4 Tradable good sector
Home tradable good distributor A home tradable good distributor combines varieties j = 1::N j of the
intermediate tradable goods, yH;jt , into a composite tradable good Y
H
t using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator:
Y Ht 
0@NjX
j=1

yH;jt
 "H 1
"H
1A "
H
"H 1
where Y Ht and y
H
t  Y
H
t
N denote aggregate and per capita quantity respectively; "
H > 0 is the elasticity of
subsitution across goods j. The tradable good distributor maximizes prots by choosing, Y Ht ; while taking
prices, PHt and P
H;j
t ; as given:
PHt Y
H
t  
NjX
j=1
PH;jt y
H;j
t
The optimality condition yields a downward slopping demand function for each intermediate good of variety
j :
yH;jt =
"
PH;jt
PHt
# "H
yHt
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where the associated price index is PHt 
PNj
j=1

PH;jt
1 "H 11 "H
:
3.3.5 Intermediate tradable good rms
There are N j intermediate non-tradable good rms indexed by the upperscript j: Each intermediate tradable
good rm j supplies variety j by solving a two-step problem. First, intermediate rm j minimizes its cost by
choosing its factor inputs kH;jt 1 and l
H;j
t :
	

yH;jt

= min
fkH;jt 1;lH;jt g
n
Ptr
k
t k
H;j
t 1 + Ptw
H
t l
H;j
t
o
taking prices as given and subject to the production function:
yH;jt = A
H
t fygt g{
H
1

kH;jt 1
aH 
lH;jt
1 aH{H2
(35)
Each intermediate tradable good rm j produces a di¤erentiated product j utilising as inputs, ygt ; per rm
public good (see section 3.4.2) which as before is used as an intermediate productive input, kH;jt 1; physical
capital rented from households in fully competitive capital markets and labour services rented from households,
lH;jt . A
H
t ; measure productivity in the tradable sector. {H1 > 0 is a parameter that determines the share of
public productive input; {H2 2 [0; 1] ; determines the share of private productive inputs. While aH and 1  aH
are structural parameters related to capital and labour income share in the non-tradable sector. The rst
order conditions are given by (where H;it is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (35)):
Ptr
H;k
t = 
H;j
t a
H{H2
yH;jt
kH;jt 1
(36)
Ptw
H
t = 
H;j
t
 
1  aH{H2 yT;jt
lT;jt
(37)
Plugging the conditional factor demands into the nominal cost function we get the minimum nominal cost
function for any given level of production, 	

yH;jt

: It can be shown that the associated Lagrange multiplier
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is equal to the nominal marginal cost H;jt =
@	(yH;jt )
@yH;jt
: Nominal prots of rm j can be written as:
Pt!
H;j
t = P
H;j
t y
H;j
t   PtrH;kt kH;jt 1   PtwHt lH;jt  
H
2
 
PH;jt
PH;jt 1
  1
!2
PHt y
H
t (38)
In the second step, each rm i chooses its price, PH;jt ; to maximize its nominal prots facing Rotemberg-type
nominal rigidities:
max
PNT;jt
1X
t=0
E00;t
8<:PH;jt yH;jt  	yH;jt   H2
 
PH;jt
PH;jt 1
  1
!2
PHt y
H
t
9=;
subject to demand for each variety j:
yH;jt =
"
PH;jt
PHt
# "H
yHt
After imposing symmetry, i.e. yHt = y
H;j
t and P
H;j
t = P
H
t the prot mazimizing condition yields:
n 
1  "H pHt yHt + "H 0HyHt o
 H

pHt
pHt 1
Pt
Pt 1
  1

pHt y
H
t
pHt
pHt 1
Pt
Pt 1
+ 
rt+1
rt+1
Pt
Pt+1
n
H

PHt+1
PHt
Pt+1
Pt
  1

PHt+1y
H
t+1
PHt+1
PHt
Pt+1
Pt
o
= 0
(39)
where  H
0
t denotes real marginal cost.
3.4 Government
3.4.1 Government Budget Constraint
The sequential government budget constraint in real per capita terms is written as:
dt = Rt 1
g
t dt 1 +Qt 1
St
St 1
(1  gt ) dt 1 + gct + git + gwt    lt    t (40)
where dt  DtN is real per capita total public debt and gt = PtBtPtDt and (1  
g
t )  StP

t F
g
t
PtDt
are shares of
total public debt held by domestic and foreign households respectively; gct ; g
i
t; g
w
t and 
l;r
t ,
l;nr
t < 0 are
government consumption, investment, public wage bill and public transfers in real and per capita terms,
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 lt  r l;rt + nr l;nrt 25 ; and  t are total tax revenues in real and per capita terms dened as:
 t   ct (rcrt + nrcnrt ) + nt r

wHt l
H;r
t + w
NT
t l
NT;r
t + w
P
t l
P;r
t

+nt 
nr

wHt l
H;nr
t + w
NT
t l
NT;nr
t + w
P
t l
P;nr
t

+kt 
rPt

rH;kt k
H;r
t 1 + e!H;rt + rNT;kt kNT;rt 1 + e!NT;rt 
(41)
Notice that the public wage bill is given by (in real and per capital terms):
gwt  wPt lgt (42)
Thus, the Government has nine scal policy instruments, gct ; g
i
t; g
w
t , 
l
t; 
c
t ; 
n
t ; 
k
t ; dt; 
g
t at its disposal. In
each period scal policy can set eight policy instruments exogenously while one needs to adjust residually to
satisfy the government budget constraint. In what follows, unless otherwise stated the residual scal policy
instrument is public debt, dt: For more details see Appendix C.
3.4.2 Production of public goods-services
A single public rm produces a public good utilizing purchases of private goods, gct , public capital, k
g
t 1; and
labour services rented from households,lgt ; via the following technology (as in Economides, Papageorgiou, and
Philippopoulos (2017)):
ygt = At
 
kgt 1
ag1 (lgt )ag2 (gct )1 ag1 ag2 (43)
where ygt  Y
g
t
N ; k
g
t 1 
Kgt 1
N , l
g
t  L
g
t
N and g
c
t denote per capita quantities and a
g
1; a
g
2 2 (0; 1) are parameters
that measure the associated shares of public productive inputs. Public capital law of motion is given by:
kgt = (1  g) kgt 1 + git (44)
where 0 < g < 1 is the depreciation rate of public capital stock.
25Where r  Nr
N
and nr  Nnr
N
are population shares.
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3.5 Market clearing conditions
In this section we solve for a symmetric equilibrium in per capita terms. Without loss of generality we set
N i = N j = N and r  NrN , nr  N
nr
N are Savers and Non-Savers population shares. Below, we present the
market clearing conditions by market, i.e. the nal good, tradable and non-tradable goods markets, labour
markets, capital and bonds markets. In the nal good market the market clearing condition yields:
yt = 
rcrt + 
rxH;rt + 
rxNT;rt + 
nrcnrt + g
c
t + g
i
t (45)
The market clearing condition in the tradable good market yields:
yHt = y
H;d
t + xt (46)
where yH;dt  Y
H;d
t
N and xt  XtN denote domestic absorption the home tradable produced good and exports
per capita: For the non-tradable good the market clearing condition is yNTt =
1
Ni
NiX
i=1
yNT;it : In capital markets:
1
N
NjX
j=1
kH;jt = k
H;j
t =
1
N
NrX
r=1
kH;rt = 
rkH;rt
1
N
NiX
i=1
kNT;it = k
NT;i
t =
1
N
NrX
r=1
kNT;rt = 
rkNT;rt
In the labour market of the home tradable good the market clearing condition yields:
lHt = v
rlH;rt + v
nrlH;rt (47)
In the labour market of the non-tradable good the market clearing condition yields:
lNTt = v
rlH;rt + v
nrlH;nrt (48)
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The market clearing condition in the labour market of the public good is:
lgt = v
rlP;rt + v
nrlP;nrt (49)
The market clearing condition nn domestic government bonds market is:
NrX
r=0
brt = N
r
t bt (50)
Notice that aggregating total prots in the two sectors across rms and households yields
PNr
r=1 !
H;r
t =
Nr!H;rt =
PNi
i=1 !
H;i
t = N
i!H;it and
PNr
r=1 !
NT;r
t = N
r!NT;rt =
PNj
j=1 !
NT;j
t = N
j!NT;jt : For more details on
the aggregation and the market clearing conditions see Appendices A and B respectively.
3.6 The evolution of net foreign debt
Combining the aggregate Ricardian household budget constraint with the government budget constraint and
substituting the denitions for prots in the tradable and non-tradable sector, the market clearing conditions
for nal good, tradable and non-tradable goods, labour and capital markets and the aggregate budget con-
straint of non-Ricardian households yields a dynamic equation that governs the evolution of net foreign debt
(assets) (for more details see Appendix D). The evolution of net foreign debt in per capita terms is given by:
StP

t f
g
t   StP t vrfrt = Qt 1StP t 1fgt 1  Qt 1StP t 1vrfrt 1
+PFt y
F
t   PHt xt + r (ft ; f) + 
NT
2

pNTt
pNTt 1
Pt
Pt 1
  1
2
pNTt y
NT
t
+
H
2

pHt
pHt 1
Pt
Pt 1
  1
2
pHt y
H
t
(51)
where fgt  F
g
t
N and y
F
t  Y
F
t
N denote per capita quantities: StP

t
 
fgt   vrfrt

is net external debt. A
positive (negative) value implies that the small open economy is a net debtor (creditor). The trade balance is
dened as PHt xt   PFt yFt :
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3.7 Denition of GDP
For our quantitative analysis we need to dene a measure of aggregate domestic output, ygdpt : In the present
model we incorporate public employment which yields income from public wages, thus, in order to be consistent
with national accounts denitions we include the public wage bill in the denition of aggregate domestic output
following Forni, Gerali, and Pisani (2010) and Papageorgiou (2014). Nominal GDP, Pty
gdp
t ; at current prices
and per capita terms is given by:
Pty
gdp
t  Pt (rcrt + nrcnrt ) + Ptr
 
xHt + x
NT
t

+ Pt
 
gct + g
i
t + g
w
t

+ PHt xt   PFt yFt
where using the denition of zero prot conditions, clearing market conditions for the nal good and the
tradable good yields:
ygdpt = p
H
t y
H
t + p
NT
t y
NT
t + g
w
t (52)
In what follows, we use, Pty
gdp
t ; to express several theoretical variables as GDP shares.
3.8 Monetary and Fiscal policy regimes
To solve the model we need to specify the monetary and scal policy regimes.
3.8.1 Monetary policy and exchange rate regime
Ireland is a member of a currency union; thus we solve for a monetary regime without monetary independence
and a xed exchange rate regime. In particular, we assume that the nominal depreciation rate, t  StSt 1 ; is
exogenously set while at the same time the nominal interest rate on domestic government bonds, Rt; becomes
an endogenous variable (for similar modelling see Philippopoulos, Varthalitis, and Vassilatos (2017)).
3.8.2 Fiscal policy rules
The Irish Government can follow an independent scal policy. In this paper we follow common practice in
the related literature and we adopt a rule-like approach to policy. That is the main spending-tax policy
instruments react to the debt-to-GDP ratio while scal persistence is captured by including an autoregressive
term. For our quantitative analysis we express all spending instruments as shares of steady state GDP, ygdp
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as it is dened in section 3.7, namely, the ratio of government consumption to GDP, sg;ct  g
c
t
ygdp
; the ratio of
public investment to GDP, sg;it  g
i
t
ygdp
; the ratio of public wages to GDP, swt  g
w
t
ygdp
; the ratio of total public
transfers to GDP, slt  g
l
t
ygdp
: Then the associated scal rules are given by:
sg;ct   sg;c = g;c
 
sg;ct 1   sg;c
  g;c dt
ygdpt
  d
ygdp
!
+ "g;ct (53)
sg;it   sg;i = g;i

sg;it 1   sg;i

  g;i
 
dt
ygdpt
  d
ygdp
!
+ "g;it (54)
swt   sw = w
 
swt 1   sw
  w dt
ygdpt
  d
ygdp
!
+ "wt (55)
slt   sl = l
 
slt 1   sl
  l dt
ygdpt
  d
ygdp
!
+ "lt (56)
 ct    c = c
 
 ct 1    c

+ 
c
 
dt
ygdpt
  d
ygdp
!
+ "ct (57)
kt   k = k
 
kt 1   k

+ 
k
 
dt
ygdpt
  d
ygdp
!
+ "kt (58)
nt   n = n
 
nt 1   n

+ 
n
 
dt
ygdpt
  d
ygdp
!
+ "nt (59)
where g;c; g;i; w; l; c; k; n 2 [0; 1) are autoregressive coe¢ cients, g;c; g;i; w; l,c ; k ; n  0
are feedback policy coe¢ cients on public debt to GDP ratio while variables without time subscript denote
policy target values. Finally, "g;ct ; "
g;i
t ; "
g;w
t ; "
g;l
t ; "
c
t ; "
g;k
t ; "
g;n
t are iid scal shocks that capture discretionary
changes in scal policy instruments. In section 7.3 we augment these rules to study alternative scal nancing
schemes.
3.9 Closing the Small Open Economy
As is well known, to avoid non-stationarity and convergence to a well dened steady state we need to depart
from the benchmark small open economy model (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003)). In this paper, we
endogenize the world interest rate, i.e. the nominal interest rate at which the domestic country borrows from
the international capital markets, Qt: Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), Garcia-Cicco, Pancrazi, and
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Uribe (2010) and Philippopoulos, Varthalitis, and Vassilatos (2017) we assume that the small open economy
risk premium is an increasing function of the end-of-period total public debt as a share of nominal GDP,
Ptdt
Pty
gdp
t
; when this share exceeds an exogenous certain threshold D: The equation governing the sovereign risk
premia is:
Qt = Q

t +  
d

e
Ptdt
Pty
gdp
t
 D   1

+ e"
q
t 1   1 (60)
where Qt denotes the world interest rate plus the time-invariant component of the Irish sovereign premia and
is exogenously determined,  d is a parameter which measures the elasticity of the interest rate with respect
to deviations of the total public debt to GDP ratio from its threshold value, "qt ; as follows:
log ("qt ) = 
q log
 
"qt 1

+ qt
where q 2 (0; 1) is a parameter measuring the persistence of world interest rate shocks and qt is an iid shock.
The terms of trade are dened as the relative price of exports in terms of imports:
tott =
PHt
PFt
(61)
Following Philippopoulos, Varthalitis, and Vassilatos (2017) we assume that world demand for exports is
exogenous and thus the terms of trade become an endogenous variable. That is, domestic exports are given
by:
xt = 
xxt 1 + (1  x)

tott
tot
 x
(62)
where 0 < x < 1 is a parameter that governs the persistence of exports while exports are also function of
deviations in the terms of trade from its steady state value. The latter term ensures dynamic stability and
allows exports to have an endogenous feedback from changes in the relative price of Irish exports. Where,
x > 0; implies that an increase in the relative price of exports to imports results in a decrease in the world
demand for the home produced tradable good.
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3.10 Decentralized Equilibrium
The Decentralized Equilibrium is a set of 47 processes crt ; 
r
t ; l
H;r
t ; l
NT;r
t ; l
P;r
t ; k
H;r
t 1; k
NT;r
t 1 ; f
r
t ; c
nr
t ; 
nr
t ; l
H;nr
t ;
lNT;nrt ; l
P;nr
t ; l
H;i
t ; l
NT;j
t ; l
g
t y
H
t ; 	
H0
t ; !
H
t ; r
H;k
t ; w
H
t ; y
NT
t ; 	
NT 0
t ; !
NT
t ; r
NT;k
t ; w
NT
t ; k
g
t ; y
g
t ; w
P
t ; dt;  t; yt;
yTt ; y
H;d
t ; y
F
t ; y
gdp
t ; Qt; Rt; P
H
t ; P
NT
t ; P
T
t ; Pt; P
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t ; x
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t ; x
NT
t ; xt; tott satisfying equations (3)-(12),(14),(15)-
(19),(22)-(24),(27)-(29), (30)-(34),(35)-(39),(40)-(46),(47)-(49),(51),(52), (60)-(62), and 11 processes gct ; g
i
t;
gwt ; 
l
t; s
g;c
t ; s
g;i
t ; s
w
t ; s
l
t; 
c
t ; 
k
t ; 
n
t ; satisfying the denitions of the output shares of government spending in
section 3.8.2 and the scal rules (53)-(59) given the exogenous variables P t ; A
H
t ; A
NT
t ; A
g
t and t
26 and initial
conditions for the state variables. The full DE system is presented in Appendices F and H.
4 Calibration and steady-state solution
This section calibrates the model for Irish economy using annual data over 2001-2014, unless otherwise stated.
We employ data from various sources, namely ESRI database, CSO, Eurostat and OECD-TiVA (details are
in Appendix J). In the present model, there are 38 parameters that need to be calibrated ; ; H ; NT ;
g; H ; NT ; g; #g; "H ; "NT ; ; H ; ; H ; aH ; aNT ; H ; NT ; H ; NT ; g; g; Q; d;  d; H ; NT ; ; r;
nr; x; x; H ; NT ; AH ; ANT ; Ag: In addition, there are 8 feedback policy coe¢ cients in the associated scal
rules g;c; g;i; g;w; s
l;r; s
l;nr; 
c
; 
k
; 
n
as well as 7 steady-state values for the scal policy variables,
sg;c; sg;i; sw; sl;  c; k; n. We assign values to the parameters of the model in three di¤erent ways: (a) based
on parameters widely used in related DSGE models, (b) parameters set to match rst moments of the Irish
data and (c) parameters set to match second moments of the Irish data. The time unit is a year.
4.1 Parameters widely used in related DSGE models
We employ conventional parameter values used in the DSGE literature for the fteen structural parameters
that belong to this category. In particular the inverse of the elasticity of intertemoral substitution, ; is set
equal to 2, the preference parameter which measures the degree of substitutability/complementarity between
private and public goods, #g; is set equal to 0 in the benchmark calibration (in section 7.4 we relax this
assumption); the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply for tradable, H ; non-tradable, NT ; and
26The exchange depreciation rate is exogenous since Ireland participates in a currency union, for simplicity we assume t  1:
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public, g; hours worked is set equal to 2, the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the composite
tradable good and the non-tradable good, ; is set equal to 0.5, the intratemporal elasticity of substitution
between the domestic absorption of the home produced tradable good and the imported good, H ; is set equal
to 1. H = NT = g are set equal to 4 so as the weighted average of hours worked to be equal to 0.4, 0.38 and
0.31 in the tradable, non-tradable and public sector respectively. The elasticities of substitution among the
di¤erent intermediate good varieties in the tradable, "H ; and non-tradable sector, "NT , yield price markups
equal to 1.1 and 1.4 respectively which are consistent with the fact that the tradable sector is more competitive
than the non-tradable sector in Eurozone countries (see also Papageorgiou and Vourvachaki (2017) and Sajedi
(2018)). Finally the scale parameters, AH ; ANT ; Ag are normalized to 1.
4.2 Parameters set to match rst moments of the Irish data
The fteen structural parameters in this category are ; ; H ; aH ; aNT ; H ; NT ; H ; NT ; g; g; Q;
d; r; nr: The value of the time preference rate is implied by equation (12),  = 1=Q; where in steady
state Q = R = Q = 1:043 (ination is normalized to 1): Q is the sum of the world interest rate and the
invariant component of Irelands interest rate premium. In turn, R = Q = 1:043 follows from setting the
gross interest rate equal to the average value of the real interest rate plus the invariant component of the Irish
sovereign premium.27 Structural parameters  and H capture the degree of openness of the Irish economy.
In particular, 1   , governs the share of the non-tradable input in the production of the nal good, thus
this implicitly determines the size of the non-tradable sector vis-a-vis the tradable sector in gross value added
terms. To calibrate, ; we target the ratio of the gross value added produced in the non-tradable sector to
the sum of value added produced in the tradable and non-tradable sectors. This share is equal to 41% in the
Irish economy. To do this, we add the following restriction when we solve for the steady state solution of the
model:
PNT yNT
PHyH + PNT yNT
= 0:41 (63)
27We dene Irelands sovereign risk premium as the di¤erence between Irelands and Germanys nominal interest rates on 10
year maturity government bond. Real interest rate for Ireland and Germany are computed employing data on nominal interest
rate on government bonds from Eurostat deated with HICP. In particular, we employ the "EMU convergence criterion series -
annual data [irt_lt_mcby_a]" and "HICP (2015 = 100) - annual data (average index and rate of change) [prc_hicp_aind]" for
the nominal interest rate and HICP respectively over the period 2001-2008. We focus on that period since we do not want our
results to be distorted by the extreme values of the 2008-2010 Irish debt crisis.
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This implies that the associated tradable share, P
HyH
PHyH+PNT yNT
; is equal to 59%. The parameter, H ; governs
the share of domestic absorption of home produced tradable good vis-a-vis the imported good and implicitly
determines the share of the home produced tradable good that it is exported abroad. To calibrate this
parameter we target the value added export share in GDP which is equal to 52%28 . Thus we impose:
PHx
Pygdp
= 0:52 (64)
The parameter, 1  aH ; is calibrated to match the average value of the labour share in the tradable sector
over 2001-2014 which is equal to 0.39:
PwH lH
PHyNT
= 0:39 (65)
which implies that aH equal to 0.571 is consistent with the capital intensity of the tradable sector. Similarly,
the labour share in the non-tradable sector, 1   aNT ; is calibrated to match the average value of the labour
share in the non-tradable sector we observe in the Irish data, so we impose:
PwNT lNT
PNT yNT
= 0:54
which in turn yields aNT equal to 0.244 indicating the labour intensity of the non-tradable sector29 . The shares
of public capital in the production functions of both sectors, H and NT ; are set equal to the average public
investment to GDP ratio found in the data as in Baxter and King (1993), i.e. are set equal to 0.035. The
depreciation rates, H ; NT ; g; are calibrated by constructing time series for the private and public capital
stock employing the methodology in Coenen, Karadi, Schmidt, and Warne (2018) and Gogos, Mylonidis,
Papageorgiou, and Vassilatos (2014). The associated values are H = 0:071; NT = 0:051 and g = 0:0741
(see Appendix I for details). The threshold value, D; above which the sovereign risk premia emerge, is set
equal to 60%. That is the average value of the Irish public debt to GDP ratio between 2001 and 2014 and also
coincides with the limit imposed by the Maastricht Criteria for all EU countries. Finally, we set the fraction
28 In the model exports and imports are value added while national accounts provide data on gross exports and imports which
include intermediate goods. For that reason, we employ data from OECD-TiVA database which provide data on exports in
value added (time series Domestic value added embodied in foreign nal demand "FFD_DVA"). Irish data are only available for
2001-2011. We calibrate the model to match exports expressed in value added terms and the trade balance as share of GDP and
thus we obtain residually a value for imports.
29Our calibration is consistent with the declining labour share observed in Irish data see OECD (2018).
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of "Savers" to total population, r; equal to 0.7, which is consistent with data reported in the Irish module of
the Household Finance and Consumption Survey30 (2013) and in line with values reported in previous studies,
e.g. Forni et al. (2009), Coenen, Straub, and Trabandt (2013), Papageorgiou (2014).
Table 1: Parameter values in (a) and (b)
Parameter Implied Value Description
 0:9588 time discount factor
 2 inverse of elasticity of substitution in consumption
#g 0 substitutability/complementarity between public and private consumption
H 2 inverse of Frisch labour elasticity in the tradable sector
NT 2 inverse of Frisch labour elasticity in the non-tradable sector
P 2 inverse of Frisch labour elasticity in public sector
H ; NT ; g 4 preference parameter related to work e¤ort (all sectors)
H 0:071 capital depreciation rate in the tradable sector
NT 0:051 capital depreciation rate in the non-tradable sector
g 0:0741 capital depreciation rate in the public sector
aH 0:571 share of physical capital in the tradable sector
aNT 0:244 share of physical capital in the non-tradable sector
ag1 0:183 share of public capital in the public sector
ag2 0:542 share of public labour in the public sector
H 0:035 public capital elasticity in the production function (tradable)
NT 0:035 public capital elasticity in the production function (non-tradable)
"H 11 price elasticity of demand in the tradable sector
"NT 3:5 price elasticity of demand in the non-tradable sector
 0:5817 share of tradable in the production of the nal good
H 0:03 share of domestic tradable in the production of the composite tradable good
 0:5 elasticity of substitution between the composite tradable and the non-tradable good
H 1 elasticity of substitution between domestic tradable and imported good
r 0:7 total population share of "Savers"
nr 0:3 total population share of "non-Savers"
g 0:5 share of public debt held by foreign investors
AH ; ANT ; Ag 1 productivity/scale parameter(s) (all sectors)
D 0:6 debt to GDP threshold value
30 In Household Finance and Consumption Survey (2013) is reported that 88.6% of Irish households own a savings account
while 56.8% have access to some form of loans. These denitions are closely related to the denition of "Ricardians/Savers" in
our model, thus we take a value close to their average, i.e. 0.7.
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4.3 Parameters set to match second moments of the Irish data
The parameters H ; NT ; ;  d; x and x are calibrated to capture the second moments properties of key
endogenous variables of the model. The theoretical second moments are computed conditional on tradable and
non-tradable TFP shocks31 . The parameters H ; NT are calibrated to mimic the volatilies of physical capital
time series in the tradable and non-tradable sectors. The parameter,  and  d; are calibrated to match
the volatility of the trade balance observed in Irish data as well as to ensure that the solution of the model
is dynamically stable32 . The parameters, x and x; are calibrated to force the volatility and persistence of
exports implied by the model to be as close as possible to the actual volatility and persistence of Irish exports.
Finally H and NT are calibrated based on the study of Druant et. al (2009) which along with the associated
elasticities of substitution among di¤erentiated varieties in the tradable and non-tradable sectors implies that
rms adjust their prices every 1.1 and 1.2 years in the tradable and non-tradable sectors respectively.
Table 2: Parameter values in (c)
Parameter Implied Value Description
H 71 Rotemberg parameter in the tradable sector
NT 165 Rotemberg parameter in the non-tradable sector
H 1.56 capital adjustment cost in the tradable sector
NT 0.39 capital adjustment cost in the non-tradable sector
 0.01 adjustment cost in international borrowing
 d 0.002 risk premium coe¢ cient on total public debt to GDP ratio
4.4 Fiscal data
To set the long run values of scal variables we employ data from Eurostat. Regarding spending instruments,
the long-run value of public spending on goods and services, sg;c, public investment, sg;i, public wage bill, sw
and public transfers, sl; as shares of output are set equal to their data averages over the period 2001 to 2014.
We set the long run values of tax instruments equal to the associated e¤ective tax rates, i.e. consumption,
 c, capital, k, and labour, n, tax rates are set equal to the associated 2001-2014 average e¤ective tax rates.
31 In particular, we calibrate the parameters that govern the productivity process in the tradable and non-tradable sectors, i.e.
A
H
; A
NT
; A
H
; A
NT
to match the volatility and persistence of the actual Irish real GDP as well as mimic as close as possible
the volatilities and persistence observed in the GVA in the tradable and non-tradable sectors respectively. TFP follow an AR(1)
process, i.e. logAt =  logAt 1 + "A:
32The calibrated value for the parameter,  d; that governs the debt elasticity of nominal interest implies that a 1% increase
in debt to GDP ratio above its threshold value results in a 0.2% increase in the risk premium. This calibration implies similar
dynamics for the risk premium as in HERMES-13 see Bergin et al. (2013).
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The e¤ective tax rates are constructed following the methodology in Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) (more
details on the methodology are reported in Kostarakos and Varthalitis (2019)). Finally, we set g = 0:56
which implies that 56% of total public debt is held by foreign investors33 .
Table 3: Fiscal data
Fiscal variable Implied Value Description
sg;c 0.051 government purchases of goods and services to GDP
sg;i 0.035 public investment to GDP
sw 0.1 public wage bill to GDP
sl -0.18 public transfers to GDP
c 0.243 e¤ective tax rate on consumption
k 0.2 e¤ective tax rate on capital
n 0.354 e¤ective tax rate on labour
g 0.56 share of public debt held by Irish residents
4.5 Steady-state solution
Table 4 presents the numerical solution of this system when we use the parameter values and policy instruments
in Tables 1-3. We compare our solution with some key macroeconomic ratios observed in the Irish data.
Table 4: Steady state solution
Variables Description Model Data
rcr+nrcnr
yGDP
Private consumption to GDP 0.48 0.48
PHyH
PHyH+PNT yNT
Share of tradables to total GVA in the private sector 0.59 0.59
PNT yNT
PHyH+PNT yNT
Share of non-tradables to total GVA in the private sector 0.41 0.41
PHx PF yF
Pygdp
Trade balance to GDP 0.16 0.14
PxH+PxNT
Pygdp
Investment to GDP 0.16 0.21
PwNT lNT
PNT yNT
Labour share in the non-tradable sector 0.54 0.54
PwH lH
PHyH
Labour share in the tradable sector 0.39 0.39
PHx
PyGDP
Exports to GDP 0.52 0.52
r(kH+kNT )
yGDP
Physical capital to GDP 2.5 2.07
33The Annual Report on Public Debt (2018) indicates that 56% of total Irish public debt is held by foreign investors.
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5 Fiscal policy transmission mechanism
In this section we present the impulse response functions of the key endogenous variables of the model to
temporary discretionary scal changes in the main scal policy instruments. This provides insight into the
transmission channel of scal policy changes in the Irish economy. To do this, we implement exogenous scal
shocks to the main tax-spending instruments in equations (53-59). For comparison purposes we set the
persistence parameter in each scal rule equal to 0.8 while the magnitude of the scal shocks is 1% of the pre
stimulus GDP on impact. In what follows, we assume perfect foresight which means that the entire path of
scal actions is fully anticipated by households and rms34 .
Due to the structure of the present model which is designed to resemble some key structural characteristics
of the Irish economy, the sign and the magnitude of the e¤ect as well as the transmission mechanism of the
scal stimulus di¤ers between the tradable and the non-tradable sector. Our results indicate that a scal
stimulus increases Irish GDP; however this works solely through the non-tradable sector while the tradable
sector shrinks. This is highly dependent on the degree of openness of the Irish economy.
5.1 Spending shocks
We start by studying the e¤ects of a temporary discretionary scal change in government consumption, sg;c.
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamic responses of the key Irish macroeconomic variables when we implement an
exogenous shock to government consumption. A scal stimulus via government consumption causes an increase
in Irish GDP. This aggregate increase can be solely attributed to the stimulative e¤ects that sg;c induces in
the non-tradable sector (see the impulse response of pNT yNT ) while the tradable sector contracts initially
and eventually increases (see the impulse response of pHyH). However, the e¤ects on the tradable sector
are quantitatively small. Since the government scal shock results in di¤erent sectoral dynamic responses,
we organize our discussion of the scal transmission mechanism around the impacts for the two sectors, i.e.
non-tradable and tradable.
Regarding the non-tradable sector, rms increase production of the non-tradable good to meet the increased
domestic demand stemming from a government consumption stimulus. To produce this additional output,
34To solve the model numerically we use the Non-Linear solver of Dynare; in particular the algorithm that uses a Newton-type
method to solve the simultaneous equation system.
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they rent physical capital and hire labour, i.e. private investment, xNT ; and hours worked, lNT , in the non-
tradable sector increase. The increased demand for productive factor inputs in the non-tradable sector causes
an increase in the associated factor prices, i.e. private wages, wNT ; and return on physical capital, rNT ; which
subsequently lead to upward pressures in the sectoral price, pNT . The increase in the relative price of the
non-tradable sector implies a deterioration in the competitiveness of the Irish economy vis-à-vis the rest of
the world. This also can be seen by the the impulse response of, pF ; which in our model is the real exchange
rate. A decrease in pF (i.e. real appreciation) means that foreign prices decrease vis-à-vis the domestic price
of the nal good and as a result imports increase, pF yF .
The tradable sector contracts vis-à-vis the non-tradable sector. By construction the Government allocates
its expenditures both in the home produced and imported tradable goods. The impulse response functions
show that government consumption crowds out exports, pHx ; while crowds in imports, pF yF . As a result,
the trade balance deteriorates in response to a positive government consumption shock (this is consistent with
empirical evidence see e.g. in Benetrix and Lane (2009) and Lane (2010)). This negative e¤ect on the Irelands
trade balance reverses any positive e¤ect from the scal stimulus on tradable production. As a result, factor
inputs shrink, namely private investment, xH ; and hours worked, lH ; and this exerts downwards pressures on
sectoral factor prices, pH . This reduction in factor prices gradually improves the terms of trade and shifts
back resources to the tradable sector once the scal stimulus comes to an end; thus tradable output moves
slightly upwards however this increase is quantitatively small.
The e¤ect of a scal stimulus on aggregate private consumption depends on the weighted response of
"Ricardians/Savers" and "Non-Ricardians/Non-Savers" consumption. A scal stimulus causes a negative
wealth e¤ect for "Ricardians/Savers" households. This works as follows, higher government consumption
increases the debt-to-output ratio (see the dynamic response of d=ygdp); in response to the deviation of debt
from its target level scal policy reduces public transfers see the dynamic response of sl (for alternative scal
nancing schemes see section 7.3). Since "Ricardians/Savers" can smooth their lifetime consumption path
through borrowing/lending, they reduce current consumption, cr, to compensate for the future income loss
caused by reduction in public transfers. On the other hand, "Non-Ricardians/Non-Savers" live hand to mouth
which means that they consume any additional temporary income produced by the scal stimulus. As a result
they increase current consumption, cnr, over the scal stimulus period while they decrease future consumption,
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i.e. once the scal stimulus comes to an end.
Figure 1: Dynamic responses to a government consumption shock
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Similarly, Figure 2 illustrates the dynamic e¤ects on Irish macroeconomic variables of a discretionary
temporary increase in public investment. As it is expected, the transmission channel is similar to the case of a
policy intervention via government consumption35 . In the short run the qualitative and quantitative e¤ects are
almost identical with those of an increase in government consumption. However, we observe some quantitative
di¤erences in the medium run, mainly because public investment increases the public capital stock; thus, the
productive e¤ects of a scal stimulus through public investment are usually more persistent and long lasting.
35 In the present model both government consumption and investment are used as productive inputs in public production see
equation (43).
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Figure 2: Dynamic responses to a public investment shock
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Figure 3 illustrates the dynamic e¤ects on Irish macroeconomic variables from an increase in public wage
bill which in the present model specication implies an increase in public wages36 . As with previous spending
instruments, an increase in public wages boosts aggregate domestic output37 , ygdp; however the magnitude and
transmission mechanism through which an increase in public wages a¤ects the Irish economy di¤ers from the
previous spending categories. An increase in public wages implies a positive change in the disposable income
of both types of households38 . As a result current aggregate consumption increases. As expected, the e¤ect on
private consumption is higher in magnitude for "non-Savers" due to their nancial constraints. The increase
in public wages and in private consumption fuel upward pressures in private sector wages and prices, as can be
observed from the impulse responses of wH , wNT ; pH and pNT : This adversely impacts the competitiveness
of the Irish economy vis-à-vis the rest of the world relatively more than the previous spending instruments,
as can be inferred from the prolonged increase in the terms of trade, real exchange rate appreciation and the
associated decline in exports, pHx. The negative e¤ect on the Irish trade balance is more prolonged.
36Government sets the public wage bill, gw  wglg ; then both type of houholds optimally allocate labour hours worked to the
three sectors.
37The quantitatively signicant e¤ect on aggregate output, ygdp, arises from its denition (see section 3.7). That is, the
aggregate GDP is dened as the sum of private production and public wages (for similar modelling and ndings see Forni et al.
(2010), Stahler and Thomas (2012) and Papageorgiou (2014)).
38Recall that both type of households have members that work in the public sector.
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Figure 3: Dynamice responses to a shock in public wages
0 5 10
0
0.01
0.02
ygdp
0 5 10
-0.0005
0
0.0005
pH yH
0 5 10
-0.005
0
0.005
pN T yN T
0 5 10
-0.0002
0
0.0002
cr
0 5 10
-0.02
0
0.02
cnr
0 5 10
-0.002
0
0.002
xH
0 5 10
-0.05
0
0.05
xN T
0 5 10
-0.002
0
0.002
lH
0 5 10
-0.01
0
0.01
lN T
0 5 10
0
0.02
0.04
lg
0 5 10
-0.0005
0
0.0005
pH x
0 5 10
0
0.005
pFyF
0 5 10
-0.04
-0.02
0
tb/ygdp
0 5 10
-0.01
0
0.01
wH
0 5 10
-0.02
0
0.02
wN T
0 5 10
-0.0005
0
0.0005
pH
0 5 10
-0.0005
0
0.0005
pN T
0 5 10
-0.0005
0
0.0005
pF
0 5 10
-0.0005
0
0.0005
ToT
0 5 10
10-5
-5
0
5
Q
0 5 10
0.142
0.143
0.144
rH
0 5 10
0.115
0.12
0.125
rN T
0 5 10
-0.184
-0.183
-0.182
sl
0 5 10
0.6
0.61
0.62
d/ygdp
0 5 10
0.1
0.105
0.11
sg,i
5.2 Tax shocks
In this section we turn to the dynamic e¤ects on the Irish economy of temporary discretionary scal changes in
tax instruments, namely consumption, capital and labour tax. Figure 4 depicts the e¤ects on the Irish macro-
economic variables of a scal shock on consumption tax. A temporary decrease in the consumption tax rate
makes consumption purchases relatively cheaper, thus both types of households increase current consumption,
i.e. cr and cnr increase. As noted previously, the increase in consumption of "Non-Ricardians/Non-Savers"
is larger in magnitude. However, increasing private consumption puts upward pressures on domestic factor
and product prices leading to a deterioration in the Irish terms of trade and a reduction in exports. In other
words, a cut in consumption tax is similar to an increase in government consumption, i.e. crowds out exports
and crowds in imports. The Irish trade balance deteriorates and the tradable sector temporarily shrinks. As
above, any increase in GDP stems solely from the increase in the non-tradable production; and at the same
time crowds out private investment, hours worked and production in the tradable sector.
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Figure 4: Dynamice responses to a consumption tax shock
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Figure 5 summarizes the dynamic responce of the Irish economy to a temporary discretionary decrease in
the capital tax rate. Cuts in capital taxes fuel private investment in both sectors, however this increase takes
more time to materialize and is more prolonged in the tradable sector due to the capital intensity of this sector
(e.g. compare the impulse responses of, xH with xNT ): On the other hand, in the labour intensive non-tradable
sector the increase in investment (and physical capital) contemporaneously increases hours worked and as a
result non-tradable production rises on impact.
Capital tax cuts can have signicant e¤ects on the international competitiveness of the Irish economy. In
particular, Figure 5 shows that a decrease in the capital tax rate causes a long-lasting improvement in the
Irish terms of trade: Although the terms of trade increases on impact due to the sluggish price adjustment of
(see pH) then experiences a prolonged reduction. Irish exports, pHx; follow a similar path, i.e. they decrease
on impact but afterwards persistently increase. Thus, although the trade balance decreases39 (as in all other
scal shocks due to the reliance of the Irish economy on imports); the reduction is smaller than when the scal
stimulus is implemented via spending instruments. Finally, cuts in capital taxes induce a direct and prolonged
increase in the disposable income of "Ricardians/Savers" (recall that they earn capital income); whereas they
increase only temporarily the labour income of "non-Ricardians/non-Savers" because private wages in both
39 In Figures 1-6 we present percentage deviations of the trade balance to GDP ratio , tbt=y
gdp
t ; from its steady state value.
This ratio is reduced rst because trade balance reduces, i.e. exports decrease while imports increase, second due to the increase
in GDP.
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sectors increase. As is apparent, the e¤ect on "Savers" consumption, cr, is smaller on impact but lasts longer
as "Ricardians/Savers" can save/invest part of the current increase in their disposable income and use it to
retain a higher level of consumption over longer horizon. While the e¤ect on "Non-Savers", cnr; is larger on
impact but short-lived.
Figure 5: Dynamic responses to a capital tax shock
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Figure 6 presents the impulse responses of the Irish key macroeconomic variables to a temporary discre-
tionary decrease in labour taxes. Reduction in labour taxes induce a positive wealth e¤ect on both type of
households which increase their current consumption, cr and cnr: In addition, the lower labour tax leads to
an increase in the after tax wage that households receive in all sectors40 , and incentivize them to substitute
leisure with hours worked, i.e. hours worked increase in all sectors lH , lNT and lg (this is the intratemporal
substitution e¤ect). The increased labour supply in both sectors leads to lower equilibrium wages, wH and
wNT ; which also exerts downward pressure on the returns to capital and marginal costs. Equilibrium factor
prices fall and as a result the international competitiveness of the Irish economy improves. This is reected
in the dynamic path of the terms of trade and the associated increase in exports.
40Although pre-tax wages, wH and wNT ; fall in Figure 6, after tax wages, (1  nt )wHt and (1  nt )wNTt ; increase due to the
decrease in labour tax. The same holds for after tax public wage, i.e. (1  nt )wgt :
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Figure 6: Dynamic responses to a labour tax shock
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6 Fiscal Multipliers in Ireland
6.1 Denition
Fiscal multipliers can be measured in several ways. Following e.g. Zubairy (2014) and Leeper, Traum, and
Walker (2017), we focus on present-value multipliers which embody the full dynamics of exogenous scal actions
and discount future changes in macroeconomic variables. The present value multiplier of any government
spending instrument over a k period horizon is dened as:
PV F
g
(k) 
Et
kX
j=0
 
kY
i=0

Rt+i
t+i+1
 1!
ygdpt+j
Et
kX
j=0
 
kY
i=0

Rt+i
t+i+1
 1!
gt+j
(66)
where Rtt+1 is the model-based simulated real interest rate in period t. y
gdp
t+j is the change in output over
a k-period horizon produced by an exogenous change in spending instruments, Fgt 

gct ; g
i
t; g
w
t ;    lt
	
;
over the same k-period horizon. gt+j ; is dened as the change in the level of government spending over the
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same period: We dene gt the sum of government consumption, public investment and the public wage bill41 .
Similarly, we dene the present value multipliers of tax instruments:
PV F

(k) 
Et
kX
j=0

Rt+i
t+i+1
 1
ygdpt+j
Et
kX
j=0

Rt+i
t+i+1
 1
 t+j
(67)
where F   ct ; kt ; nt 	 represents a tax instrument while  t+j is the change in total tax revenues where
tax revenues are dened as the sum of consumption, capital and labour income taxes (as in equation (41)).
By setting k = 0; the present value multiplier becomes equal to the impact multiplier:
6.2 Fiscal stimulus scenario
In this section we develop our main scal scenario. In what follows, we focus on the scal stimulus policy
which is dened as a discretionary scal change in a particular spending or tax instrument. For reasons of
comparison, the size of the scal shock is normalized to represent an increase in government expenditures or a
decrease in total tax revenues equal to 1% of steady-state (pre-stimulus) GDP for three years. To ensure scal
sustainability, Irish scal policy is set such that total public transfers react to deviations in the debt-to-output
ratio from its target level (for alternative scal nancing schemes see section 7.3). To do this, we set the scal
policy coe¢ cient on public transfers in the associated scal rule (in equation 56) equal to l = 0:1 while to keep
the remaining scal policy instruments constant we set the remaining feedback coe¢ cients and persistence
parameters equal to 0. We examine one scal instrument at a time while the residual policy instrument is
total public debt. As above, we assume perfect foresight.
6.3 Output multipliers
Table 5 computes the present value output multipliers, ygdp; by scal instrument when we set k = 1; 2; 3:
For example, in the second row we compute the implied increase in GDP produced by a three year scal
stimulus through an associated increase in government consumption. Our model suggests that a 1% increase
41Notice that we exclude public transfers from gt since the latter are used to react to debt deviations from its target; thus
any change in public transfers is not related to the discretionary scal stimulus. When we compute public transfers multiplier gt
includes public transfers.
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in government consumption for the next three years produces a 0.59% increase in GDP in the rst year
while the cumulative discounted change is equal to a 0.42% and 0.34% increase in the second and third year
respectively.
Table 5: Present Value Output multipliers by instrument
Description Instrument 1st year 2nd year 3rd year
Gov. consumption sg;c 0.59 0.42 0.34
Gov. investment sg;i 0.62 0.37 0.25
Public wages sw 1.16 1.06 1.01
Public transfers sl 0.24 0.07 -0.02
Consuption tax  c 0.51 0.2 0.08
Capital tax k 0.44 0.07 -0.05
Labour tax n 0.09 0.2 0.29
Some key results arising from Table 5 are as follows: First, spending multipliers are in general higher in
the short-run than tax multipliers which is consistent with ndings in other empirical and theoretical studies
(for a collection of ndings across models and methodologies see in Batini et al. (2014)). Impact multipliers
indicate that the stimulative e¤ects of a scal expansion are larger in the case of government consumption
and public investment. In particular, government consumption and public investment impact multipliers are
equal to 0.59 and 0.62. The latter values tend to be smaller than spending multipliers estimates that have
been reported for the Euro Area . The relatively smaller output e¤ect of a government spending stimulus can
be attributed to several key structural characteristics of the Irish economy namely its openness, the relatively
large inuence of the tradable sector in the aggregate economy, the reliance of the Irish economy on imports
and the sensitivity of sovereign risk premia to public debt dynamics (see analysis in sections 7.1 and 7.2 below).
Our model implies that households and the government can allocate their purchases among domestic
tradable, non-tradable and imported goods. Thus, a component of government spending may lead to an
increase in imports through a direct and an indirect channel. First, the government can directly purchase
goods from domestic sources which are produced using imports or indirectly increase economic agentsincomes
who in turn spend part of this additional income on imported goods. The magnitude of this depends on the
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e¤ect of scal changes on the trade balance. Our results suggest that a scal stimulus via government spending
crowds out exports which combined with the large size and the export-orientation of the Irish tradable sector
can explain the smaller magnitude of Irish spending multipliers. This is reected in the dynamic responses of
the real exchange rate , the terms of trade and the trade balance which imply that the competitiveness of the
Irish economy deteriorates (see section 5 above for an analysis on the scal transmission mechanism).
Regarding tax multipliers, a cut in consumption tax causes a positive domestic demand e¤ect in the Irish
economy. Aggregate private consumption increases; however as explained above part of it results in larger
imports. The increased domestic demand boosts the non-tradable sector which leads to upward pressures
in factor inputs in both sectors and nally in domestic prices. The competitiveness of the Irish economy
deteriorates, exports are crowding out and the tradable sector contracts vis-à-vis the non-tradable sector.
Temporary income tax cuts (capital and labour) take relatively more time to accumulate and from a
magnitude perspective produce consistently lower impact multipliers. Income tax cuts have both demand-
and supply-side e¤ects and stimulate private consumption and investment and in almost all cases employment.
In addition, income taxes a¤ect equilibrium factor prices directly meaning that they reduce marginal costs
especially in the tradable sector. The reduction in prices in the tradable sector improves the competitiveness
of the Irish economy. As a result, Irish exports increase under both income tax cuts while the trade balance
decreases less than in all the other cases. To measure the compositional e¤ects of a scal stimulus in the Irish
economy we compute multipliers for other key Irish macroeconomic variables in the next section.
6.4 Other key multipliers
So far we have used a single measure to gauge the e¤ects of discretionary scal actions, namely the aggregate
output multiplier. Although the output multiplier enables scal policymakers to see the overall e¤ects on the
Irish economy, usually it is useful to quantify multipliers of other key endogenous macroeconomic variables.
This is of particular importance when scal policy aims to target specic sectors or/and cohorts of the pop-
ulation when forming its policy. It is well known that di¤erent scal policy instruments can have di¤erent
implications in di¤erent sectors and/or for agents of the economy (see e.g. Leeper (2010)). The openness
and the export/import-oriented nature of the Irish economy make this analysis essential for designing well
executed scal policies.
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To assess these e¤ects in Tables 6 and 7 we quantify scal multipliers for the sectoral outputs, consumption,
total and sectoral investment, agent-specic consumption and net exports42 by scal instrument (spending and
tax respectively). We compute these multipliers implementing the same scal scenario analysed in section 6.2.
To save space we only present the impact multiplier for each endogenous variable. Tables 6 and 7 illustrate
that the stimulative e¤ects on aggregate output solely comes from the non-tradable sector; whereas a scal
stimulus leaves the tradable sector una¤ected and this holds across all available scal instruments. This can
be explained by the net exports multiplier computed in the last rows of Table 6 and 7. A scal stimulus
causes a decrease in the trade balance. This can be explained by several reasons including the reliance of the
Irish economy on imports, the deterioration in the terms of trade and the resulting deterioration in domestic
competitiveness. That is, a relatively large share of the additional disposable income that may arise through
spending hikes or tax cuts will result in higher levels of imports, while Irish exports become relatively more
expensive.
Table 6: Spending Impact Multipliers
Variable sg;c sg;i sw sl
Output 0.59 0.62 1.16 0.24
Tradable -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Non-tradable 0.6 0.61 0.15 0.22
Aggregate consumption 0.03 0.07 0.187 0.27
"Savers" consumption -0.1 -0.1 0.004 0
"Non-Savers" consumption 0.12 0.17 0.183 0.27
Total Investment 0.22 0.2 0.15 0.23
Investment in the tradable sector -0.1 -0.12 0.01 0.02
Investment in the non-tradable sector 0.32 0.32 0.14 0.21
Net Exports -0.6 -0.59 -0.14 -0.2
42Net exports are dened as pHx  pF yF :
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Table 7: Tax Impact Multipliers
Variable  c k n
Output 0.51 0.44 0.09
Tradable 0.01 0.01 -0.03
Non-tradable 0.49 0.44 0.12
Aggregate consumption 0.86 0.19 0.17
"Savers" consumption 0.4 0.03 0.04
"Non-Savers" consumption 0.46 0.16 0.13
Investment 0.16 0.94 0.09
Investment in the tradable sector -0.07 0.56 0.06
Investment in the non-tradable sector 0.23 0.38 0.04
Net Exports -0.46 -0.41 -0.15
7 Robustness analysis
In this section, we perform a robustness analysis along two dimensions of the model that determine the size
of scal multipliers. First, we conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to key structural parameters of the
model. In doing so, we focus on parameters that are required to replicate some key structural characteristics
of the Irish economy and have quantitatively signicant e¤ects on scal multipliers, e.g. the degree of openness
and the sensitivity of sovereign premia to public debt dynamics. Second, we consider alternative scal nancing
scenarios, namely a spending- and a tax-nanced budget neutral scal stimulus and compare them with our
main scal scenario.
7.1 Degree of openness
One of the most important structural characteristics of the Irish economy is its exceptional open nature. In
particular, Ireland is among the most open economies globally. This results in the following characteristics:
(i) a larger share of tradable vis-à-vis the non-tradable sector, (ii) reliance on imports both for production
and consumption, and (iii) an export-oriented tradable sector, meaning that the larger share of gross value
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added produced in this sector is exported to the rest of the world while the domestic absorption is much
smaller. These Irish specic characteristics a¤ect the size of scal multipliers qualitatively and quantitatively.
To examine the signicance of the degree of openness on our results we perform a robustness analysis with
respect to two key structural parameters of the present model. First, the parameter that governs the long run
share of tradable vis-à-vis the non-tradable production (denoted as v). Second, the parameter that governs
the long run share of domestic absorption of the home produced tradable good vis-à-vis the imported good
(denoted as vH). This parameter implicitly determines the share of exports on tradable production in gross
value added terms.
Figure 7 presents the impulse response functions of aggregate output, net exports, tradable and non-
tradable output to a temporary discretionary scal shock in government consumption (for comparison we
adopt the main scal scenario in section 5) when we vary the structural parameter, v. In particular, we
simulate the main scal scenario in three economies. First, when the associated parameter is calibrated to
reect the shares of tradable and non-tradable sectors in the Irish economy (v = 0:5817). Then, we examine
when there is a balanced economy between the tradable and non-non-tradable sectors (v = 0:5) and nally an
economy with a larger share of the non-tradable sector (v = 0:3). As the parameter v decreases the economy
depends more on the non-tradable sector which implies a smaller degree of openness.
The dynamic paths for the three economies are illustrated in Figure 7. Our results suggest that the output
multiplier is smaller when the economy relies relatively more on the tradable sector. The calibration based
on the Irish data delivers the smallest output multiplier which is consistent with the very open nature of the
Irish economy. That is, the scal stimulus is crowding out exports and crowding in imports (see the dynamic
response of net exports). This causes a contraction in the tradable sector (especially when this sector is
export-oriented as in the Irish case - see next paragraph). The larger the share of the tradable sector, the
smaller the size of the spending multiplier.
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Figure 7: The importance of the composition of output (tradable/non-tradable)
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To further explore the degree of openness channel on spending multipliers, Figure 7 depicts the associated
impulse response functions to a government consumption shock (again as it is dened in section 5) when we
vary the structural parameter governing the share of imports in the production of the composite tradable good
(and implicitly the share of exports in domestic tradable production). As above, we solve for three economies,
i.e. for an economy in which the largest share of domestic tradable production is exported to the rest of the
world while at the same time domestic investment and consumption depends heavily on imports (vH = 0:03).
This is the value calibrated using Irish data. We also solve the model, vH = 0:3 for and vH = 0:5, the latter
parameterizations result in a larger share of domestic absorption of the tradable output and at the same time
consumption and investment relies less on imports. In other words, Irish residents consume more of home
produced tradable goods and less imported goods; this implies a smaller degree of openness.
As above, the dynamic path of aggregate output indicates that the scal multiplier is getting smaller as we
decrease vH . The economic intuition is the following, government consumption stimulates domestic demand
while as indicated above crowds out net exports. Thus, the multiplier decreases (increases) as a smaller (larger)
share of home tradable production is consumed by domestic agents (see dynamic response of tradable output).
In addition, as vH increases, Irish residents and rms utilize less imports and more from the domestically
produced intermediate goods. In general, the smaller the vH , the more export oriented is the home tradable
sector and import driven domestic demand and as a result the smaller the size of the output multiplier.
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Figure 8: The importance of the export/import-orientation of the Irish economy
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7.2 Sensitivity of sovereign risk premia to debt dynamics
Ireland recently exited a programme of nancial support in which it originally entered due to unsustainable
public debt dynamics and high sovereign premia. Over the period 2010 to 2013 the Irish sovereign risk premia
rose sharply while the Irish government was unable to borrow from international nancial markets. In light of
this economic environment, the e¤ect of the scal stimulus on public debt dynamics and the sovereign premia
is very important in determining the size of output multiplier. To illustrate this, Figure 9 presents the results
of a sensitivity analysis with respect to the parameter in equation (60),  d; that governs the sensitivity of the
nominal interest rate, at which Ireland borrows from the international capital markets to deviations of the
public debt to output ratio from a threshold value. Our results indicate that a larger parameter, that results
in an increased sovereign premium, entails higher cost of international borrowing (higher nominal rates) for
an identical government spending increase. This increases the crowding out channel of the scal stimulus and,
as a result, reduces the size of the output multiplier.
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Figure 9: Sensitivity of sovereign risk premia to debt dynamics
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7.3 Method of scal nancing
In the benchmark scal scenario scal stimulus is nanced by a gradual decrease in total public transfers and
a mild increase in government debt which means that all the remaining scal instruments are kept constant
to their historical data averages. That is, we set the reaction of the public transfers to debt in the associated
scal rule (in equation 56) equal to 0.1 while the remaining feedback policy coe¢ cients are set equal to 0. As
pointed out in e.g. Leeper (2010), the size of multipliers depends on the method of scal nancing schemes.
To this end, in this section we compare three di¤erent scal nancing scenarios of an increase in government
consumption, namely our main scenario which means public transfers and debt-nanced scal stimulus along
with two budget neutral scal scenarios, i.e. a spending- and a tax-nanced scenario. To simulate these
scenarios, we augment the scal rules in equations (53-59) to react to the level of public decit/surplus. In
particular, scal rules are written as:
fgt   fg = g
 
fgt 1   fg
  gd
 
dt
ygdpt
  d
ygdp
!
  gdf (dft   df) + +"gt (68)
 t    =  ( t 1   ) + d
 
dt
ygdpt
  d
ygdp
!
+ df (dft   df) + +"t (69)
where fgt are spending instruments and dft  gct + git + gwt    lt and dft > (<) 0 implies that a country runs a
scal decit (surplus). In the spending-nanced scenario, the increase in government consumption is budget
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neutral and is nanced through a decrease in government investment. To simulate this scal scenario we
set ld = 1; 
df;gi =  9 and df;l = 9: Thus, total government spending remains constant (see the red line
with the circle marker in Figure 10) so the decit/surplus and public debt remains unchanged. Similarly,
in the tax-nanced scenario, the increase in government consumption is again budget neutral but now is
nanced through an increase in tax revenues. To simulate this scal scenario we set 
c
d = 
k
d = 
n
d = 0:7;
and 
c
df = 
k
df = 
n
df = 20: In this case, total government spending increases (see the yellow dashed line)
but at the same time tax revenues increase so as the decit/surplus and public debt remains constant. We
observe in the rst panel of Figure 10 that the main scal scenario yields the larger multiplier on impact. A
government consumption expansion nanced through cuts of other spending instruments or tax hikes mitigates
the stimulative e¤ects of an expansion in government consumption. In addition, although tax hikes are
temporary and tax rates return to its pre-stimulus value after three years, the e¤ect on output over longer
horizons is negative. Using taxes (especially distortionary income taxes) to nance scal expansions induces
negative supply-side e¤ects which dampen the e¤ect of spending stimulus over the longer run. These ndings
are consistent with similar studies that estimate negative scal multipliers over the long run when scal
stimulus is nanced through taxes (see e.g. Zubairy (2014)).
Figure 10: Alternative scal nancing schemes
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7.4 Other structural parameters
We conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to several key structural parameters that determine the size of
scal multiplier, namely the degree of complementarity/substitutability of public and private consumption,
#g 2 [ 0:24; 0:24] ; parameters that govern capital adjustment costs in both sectors, H 2 [0:1; 1] and NT 2
[0:1; 4] ; Rotemberg-type price rigidity parameters in the tradable and non-tradable sector, H 2 [20; 91],
and, NT 2 [20; 165], the elasticity of substitution between the composite tradable and non-tradable good
 2 [0:1; 2:5], the share of "non-Ricardians/Non-Savers" in Irish population, nr 2 [0:12; 0:5]. For comparison,
we also include results associated with structural parameters analysed in section 7.1.
In Table 8, we compute ranges of the rst year scal multipliers by varying one structural parameter at
a time43 . In particular, we report the rst year multiplier for the values of the associated parameter in the
rst column, for example, the government consumption, sg;c; rst year multplier varies from 0.2 to 1.12 as we
decrease  from 0.8 to 0.3 ceteris paribus. Our robustness analysis conrms that the relatively smaller size
of the Irelands scal multipliers can be mostly attributed to structural parameters associated with its degree
of openness, e.g. ; H ; ; then to parameters related to the exibility of the Irish labour44 and product
markets45 .
Table 8: Impact output multipliers by instrument
Structural parameter sg;c sg;i  c k n
 2 [0:8; 0:3] [0.2,1.12] [0.23,1.14] [0.18,0.99] [0.16,0.83] [0,0.19]
H 2 [0:01; 0:8] [0.57,0.98] [0.6,0.92] [0.5,0.73] [0.43,0.66] [0.08,0.4]
 2 [2:5; 0:1] [0.24,0.71] [0.28,0.74] [0.21,0.64] [0.195,0.55] [0.03,0.11]
#g 2 [0:24; 0:24] [0.53, 0.64] [0.63,0.6] [0.54,0.48] [0.44,0.44] [0.08,0.1]
H

NT

2 [1 (4) ; 0:1 (0:4)] [0.54, 0.63] [0.57,0.65] [0.47,0.54] [0.24,0.89] [0.07,0.1]
nr 2 [0:12; 0:5] [0.54,0.68] [0.56,0.74] [0.36,1.18] [0.36,0.69] [0.01,0.3]
H

NT

2 [20 (20) ; 91 (185)] [0.41,0.59] [0.41,0.62] [0.28,0.52] [0.29,0.44] [0.15,0.08]
43To save space in Table 8 we report results for government consumption and investment and the main tax rates. Results for
the remaining scal instruments are available upon request.
44We also solve for a version of FIR-GEM that incorporates real wage rigidity in all sectors, results are available upon request.
45Sensitivity analysis with respect to other structural parameters are available upon request.
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8 Conclusions
This paper develops FIR-GEM a medium-scale small open economy DSGE model calibrated for the Irish
economy. FIR-GEM is designed as a scal toolkit for scal policy simulations in the domestic economy.
We analyse the transmission mechanism through which Irish scal policy a¤ects the economy focusing on
key structural characteristics of the Irish economy like its degree of openness. We also quantify Irish scal
multipliers for a rich menu of scal policy instruments. We nd that in the Irish economy scal multipliers
are smaller in magnitude than most EU countries due to the degree of openness of the domestic economy and
the large inuence of the tradable sector. Fiscal policy changes result in changes in the composition of GDP
and the external balance of the Irish economy. A scal stimulus is likely to expand the non-tradable sector
vis-à-vis the tradable sector. A scal expansion via expenditures may negatively impact the Irish external
balance by causing a deterioration in Irish competitiveness; while a scal expansion via income tax cuts may
have a smaller e¤ect on the Irish external balance as production costs and prices are likely to be reduced. This
improves the competitiveness of the Irish economy and results in long lasting e¤ects on GDP. In terms of the
e¤ect on GDP in the rst year, the most e¤ective Irish scal instruments are as follows: public investment,
government consumption, consumption taxes, capital taxes, public transfers, public wages and, nally, labour
taxes. We also nd that the method of scal nancing is crucial for the e¢ cacy of a scal stimulus. A spending
stimulus nanced via tax increases mitigates the positive e¤ect on GDP.
Finally we discuss directions for future research. Irelands tradable sector consists of domestic rms and
foreign a¢ liated rms (Multinational enterprises (MNEs)). MNEs production heavily depends on inputs
such as R&D, IT software, brands which are complementary with high skilled labour. To capture MNEs
distinct production characteristics, a natural extention is to incorporate technology and intangible capital as
in e.g. McGrattan and Prescott (2009) and Klein and Ventura (2018) along with higher degree of capital-skill
complementarity in the spirit of Krusell et al. (2000). Finally, Irish labour market is heavily a¤ected by
international migration inows and outows. Both features entail non trivial e¤ects for Irish scal policy. We
leave both these extensions for future research.
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A Aggregation
Aggregating quantities across "Ricardians/Savers" households r :
NrX
t=1
crt = N
rcrt ;
NrX
t=1
xH;rt = N
rxH;rt ;
NrX
t=1
xNT;rt = N
rxNT;rt ;
NrX
t=1
kH;rt = N
rkH;rt ;
NrX
t=1
kNT;rt = N
rkNT;rt ;
NrX
t=1
lH;rt = N
rlH;rt ;
NrX
t=1
lNT;rt = N
rlNT;rt ;
NrX
t=1
!H;rt = N
r!H;rt ;
NrX
t=1
!NT;rt = N
r!NT;rt ;
NrX
t=1
brt = N
rbrt ;
NrX
t=1
frt =
Nrfrt ;
NrX
t=1
 rt = N
r l;rt :
Similarly across "non-Ricardians/non-Savers" households nr :
NnrX
nr=1
cnrt = N
nrcnrt ;
NnrX
nr=1
lH;nrt = N
nrlH;nrt ;
NnrX
nr=1
lNT;nrt = N
nrlNT;nrt ;
NnrX
t=1
nrt = N
r l;nrt :
Aggregation across intermediate non-tradable rms i :
NiX
i=1
yNT;it = N
iyNT;it ;
NiX
i=1
kNT;it = N
ikNT;it ;
NiX
i=1
lNT;it =
N ilNT;it ;
Aggregation across intermediate tradable rms j :
NjX
j=1
yNT;jt = N
jyNT;jt ;
NjX
i=1
kNT;jt = N
jkNT;jt ;
NjX
i=1
lNT;jt =
N j lNT;jt :
Small case letters denote per capita or per rm quantities. For example, the nal good in aggregate terms
is denoted as Yt; and in per capita terms is yt  YtN :
B Market clearing conditions
We solve for a symmetric equilibrium in per capita terms. Without loss of generality we set N i = N j = N and
r = N
r
N and 
nr = N
nr
N = 1  r. Below, we present the clearing market conditions by market, i.e. the nal
good, tradable and non-tradable goods markets, labour market, capital and domestic bonds market. Market
clearing condition in the nal good market yields:
yt = 
rcrt + 
rxH;rt + 
rxNT;rt + 
nrcnrt + g
c
t + g
i
t (70)
In the tradable good market (in aggregate terms):
NjX
j=1
yH;it = N
jyH;jt = Y
H;d
t +Xt (71)
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where Y H;dt is domestic absorption of home produced tradable good and Xt demand from the rest-of-the world
(i.e. exports). Equation (71) in per capita terms is written:
yHt = y
H;d
t + xt (72)
where yH;dt  Y
H;d
t
N and xt  XtN : In the non-tradable good market (in aggregate terms):
Y NTt =
NiX
i=1
yNT;it = N
iyNT;i
where yNTt  Y
NT
t
N denotes per capita quantity. In capital markets:
NjX
j=1
kH;jt = N
jkH;jt =
NrX
r=1
kH;rt = N
rkH;rt
NiX
i=1
kNT;it = N
ikNT;it =
NrX
r=1
kNT;rt = N
rkNT;rt
In labour market of the home tradable good:
NiX
i=1
lH;it =
NrX
r=1
lH;rt +
NnrX
nr=1
lH;nrt
which yields:
N ilH;it = N
rlH;rt +N
nrlH;rt (73)
In labour market of the non-tradable good:
NjX
j=1
lNT;jt =
NrX
r=1
lNT;rt +
NnrX
nr=1
lNT;rt
which yields:
N j lNT;jt = N
rlH;rt +N
nrlH;nrt (74)
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In the labour market of the public good:
Lgt  NrlP;rt +NnrlP;nrt (75)
and lgt  L
g
t
N : In domestic government bonds market:
NrX
r=0
brt = N
r
t bt (76)
Notice that aggregating total prots in the two sectors across rms and households yield
PNr
r=1 !
H;r
t =
Nr!H;rt =
PNi
i=1 !
H;i
t = N
i!H;it and
PNr
r=1 !
NT;r
t = N
r!NT;rt =
PNj
j=1 !
NT;j
t = N
j!NT;jt :
C Government Budget Constraint
The sequential government budget constraint in nominal and aggregate terms is written:
PtBt + StP

t F
g
t = Rt 1Pt 1Bt 1 +Qt 1StP

t 1F
g
t 1 + PtGt   PtTt (77)
where PtGt is total government spending expressed in units of the nal good:
PtGt  PtGct + PtGit + PtGwt   PtT l;rt   PtT l;nrt (78)
Total expenditures decomposes into government consumption, Gct ; government investment, G
i
t; public wage
bill, Gwt ; total public transfers, PtT
l
t   PtT l;rt  PtT l;nrt ; where T l;rt ; T l;rt < 0 are agent-specic public transfers:
For convenience we dene total public debt expressed in domestic currency as PtDt  PtBt+StP t F gt :Where
the share held by domestic households (Irish residents) is dened as gt  PtBtPtDt and the share held by foreigners
(non-Irish residents) is dened as (1  g)  StPt FgtPtDt :
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Total tax revenues in nominal terms are dened as:
PtTt  Pt ct (Nrcrt +Nnrcnrt ) + Ptnt Nr

wHt l
H;r
t + w
NT
t l
NT;r
t + w
P
t l
P;r
t

+Pt
n
t N
nr

wHt l
H;nr
t + w
NT
t l
NT;nr
t + w
P
t l
P;nr
t

+ktN
rPt

rH;kt k
H;r
t 1 + e!H;rt + rNT;kt kNT;rt 1 + e!NT;rt 
(79)
Using the denition of total public debt, PtDt; we can re-write (77) as follows:
PtDt = Rt 1
g
tPt 1Dt 1 +Qt 1
St
St 1
(1  gt )Pt 1Dt 1 + PtGt   PtTt
In per capita and real terms is written:
dt = Rt 1
g
t dt 1 +Qt 1
St
St 1
(1  gt ) dt 1 + gct + git + gwt    lt    t (80)
where dt  DtN ; gct  G
c
t
N ; g
c
t  G
c
t
N ; g
w
t  G
w
t
N ; 
l
t  T
l
t
N ;  t  TtN where tax revenues in real and per capita terms
are:
 t   ct
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NT
t l
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t k
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 (81)
D The evolution of net foreign debt (assets)
In this appendix we derive the equation (51) that governs the evolution of net foreign debt (assets). First, we
aggregate the Ricardian household budget constraint over r :
Pt (1 + 
c
t)N
rcrt + PtN
rxH;rt + PtN
rxNT;rt + PtN
rbrt + StP

t N
rfrt +N
r (ft ; f
)
= (1  nt )PtNr

wHt l
H;r
t + w
NT
t l
NT;r
t + w
P
t l
P;r
t

+
 
1  kt

PtN
r

rNT;kt k
NT;r
t 1 + !
NT;r
t

+
 
1  kt

PtN
r

rH;kt k
H;r
t 1 + !
H;r
t

+Rt 1Pt 1Nrbrt 1 +Qt 1StP

t 1N
rfrt 1   PtNr l;rt
(82)
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Recall that the government budget constraint in aggregate terms is written as:
PtBt + StP

t F
g
t = Rt 1Pt 1Bt 1 +Qt 1StP

t 1F
g
t 1
+PtG
c
t + PtG
i
t + PtG
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
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NT
t l
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t l
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t l
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t l
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ktNrPt

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t k
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t 1 + !
NT;r
t

(83)
Subsequently, using the fact that in equilibrium PtBt = PtNrbt we solve (83) for PtBt to subsititute out this
term from (82). We aggregate prots across rms and Ricardians households, which implies that
NiX
i=1
!NT;it =
N i!NT;it =
NrX
r=1
!NT;rt = N
r!NT;rt and
NjX
j=1
!H;jt = N
j!H;it =
NrX
r=1
!NT;rt = N
r!NT;rt . Thus, the denitions of
aggregate prots are written as:
PtN
r!NT;rt = PtN
i!NT;it = P
NT
t N
iyNT;it  PtrNT;kt N ikNT;it 1  PtwNTt N ilNT;it  N i
NT;i
2

PNTt
PNTt 1
  1
2
PNTt y
NT
t
(84)
PtN
r!H;rt = PtN
j!H;jt = P
H
t N
jyH;jt   PtrH;kt N jkH;jt 1   PtwHt N j lH;jt  N j
H;j
2

PHt
PHt 1
  1
2
PHt y
H
t (85)
Suquentially, we subsitute the equations (84) and (85) into (83), then, the marketing clearing conditions,
N jkH;jt 1 = N
rkH;rt 1; N
ikNT;it 1 = N
rkNT;rt 1 ; N
ilNT;it = N
rlNT;rt + N
nrlNT;nrt ; N
j lH;jt = N
rlH;rt + N
nrlH;nrt
and the aggregate non-Ricardian budget constraint and we subsitute the denition of the public wage bill,
PtG
w
t  NrPtwPt lP;rt +NnrPtwPt lP;nrt . The equation (82) is written:
 StP t F gt +Qt 1StP t 1F gt 1+
+PtG
c
t + PtG
i
t + PtN
rcnrt
PtN
rcrt + PtN
rxH;rt + PtN
rxNT;rt + StP

t N
rfrt
= Qt 1StP t 1N
rfrt 1 + P
NT
t N
iyNT;it + P
H
t N
jyH;jt
 N i NT;i2

PNTt
PNTt 1
  1
2
PNTt y
NT
t  N j 
H;j
2

PHt
PHt 1
  1
2
PHt y
H
t  Nr (ft ; f)
(86)
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In turn, we use the zero prot conditions for the nal good and the composite tradable good rms:
PtYt = P
T
t Y
T
t + P
NT
t Y
NT
t = P
H
t Y
H;d
t + P
F
t Y
F
t + P
NT
t Y
NT
t (87)
and the clearing market condition for the domestic tradable good:
PHt Y
H
t = P
H
t

Y H;dt +Xt

= PHt N
jyH;jt (88)
where Xt are aggregate exports and Y
H;d
t aggregate domestic absorption of the home tradable good. Non-
tradable output is written:
PNTt N
iyNT;it = P
NT
t Y
NT
t = PtYt   PHt Y Hdt   PFt Y Ft (89)
Plugging (87) and (88) into (86) we have that:
 StP t F t +Qt 1StP t 1F gt 1 + PtGct + PtGit + PtNrcnrt
PtN
rcrt + PtN
rxH;rt + PtN
rxNT;rt + StP

t N
rfrt
= Qt 1StP t 1N
rfrt 1 + PtYt   PHt Y H;dt   PFt Y Ft + PHt

Y H;dt +Xt

 N i NT;i2

PNTt
PNTt 1
  1
2
PNTt y
NT
t  N j 
H;j
2

PHt
PHt 1
  1
2
PHt y
H
t  Nr (ft ; f)
(90)
Using the clearing market condition for the nal good:
PtYt = PtN
rcrt + PtN
nrcnrt + PtN
rxH;rt + PtN
rxNT;rt + PtG
c
t + PtG
i
t (91)
(which is written in real per capita terms yt = rcrt+ 
rxH;rt + 
rxNT;rt + 
nrcnrt + g
c
t + g
i
t):
The evolution of net foreign debt in aggregate terms is given by:
StP

t F
g
t   StP t Nrfrt = Qt 1StP t 1F gt 1  Qt 1StP t 1Nrfrt 1
+PFt Y
F
t   PHt Xt
+N i 
NT;i
2

PNTt
PNTt 1
  1
2
PNTt y
NT
t +N
j 
H;j
2

PHt
PHt 1
  1
2
PHt y
H
t +N
r (ft ; f
)
(92)
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In real and capita terms:
StP

t
Pt
 
fgt   N
r
N f
r
t

= Qt 1
StP

t
Pt
Pt 1
Pt
 
fgt 1   N
r
N f
r
t 1

+PFt y
F
t   PHt xt
+
NT;i
2

PNTt
PNTt 1
  1
2
PNTt y
NT
t +
H;j
2

PHt
PHt 1
  1
2
PHt y
H
t +
Nr
N 
 (ft ; f
)
(93)
where fgt  F
g
t
N ; y
F
t  Y
F
t
N and xt  XtN are per capita imports and exports respectively.
E Prot maximization
In this appendix we solve the prot maximization problem of intermediate rms in the tradable sector. The
prot maximization problem in the non-tradable sector is similar. Each rm i chooses its price, PNT;it ; to
maximize its the expected sum of nominal prots facing Rotemberg-type nominal rigidities:
max
pNT;it
E0
1X
t=0
0;t
8<:PNT;it yNT;it  	yNT;it   NT2
 
PNT;it
PNT;it 1
  1
!2
PNTt y
NT
t
9=; (94)
,where 0;t is a stochastic discount factor, while 	

yNT;it

denotes the total nominal cost, subject to demand
for each variety i:
yNT;it =
"
PNT;it
PNTt
# "NT
yNTt (95)
The rst order condition yields:
E00;t
( 
1  "NT  hPNT;it
PNTt
i "NT
yNTt  
  "NT 	0 (:) hPNT;it
PNTt
i "NT
1
PNT;it
yNTt
)
E00;t

 NT

PNT;it
PNT;it 1
  1

PNTt y
NT
t
1
PNT;it 1

  E00;t+1

NT

PNT;it+1
PNT;it
  1

PNTt+1 y
NT
t+1

  1
PNT;it
2
PNT;it+1

= 0
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, i.e. PNT;it  PNTt and yNTt  yNT;it and multiply with PNTt :
E00;t
n 
1  "NT PNTt yNTt + "NT	0 (:) yNTt o
 E00;t
n
NT

PNTt
PNTt 1
  1

PNTt y
NT
t
PNTt
PNTt 1
o
+ 0;t+1
n
NT

PNTt+1
PNTt
  1

PNTt+1 y
NT
t+1

  1
PNTt

PNTt+1
o
= 0
(96)
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Divide with Pt and subsituting the stochastic discount factor 0;t+1  1Rt = 
rt+1
rt
Pt
Pt+1
:
E0
n 
1  "NT  pNTt yNTt + "NT 0 (:) yNTt o
 NT

pNTt
pNTt 1
Pt
Pt 1
  1

pNTt y
NT
t
pNTt
pNTt 1
Pt
Pt 1
+ 
rt+1
rt
Pt
Pt+1
n
NT

pNTt+1
pNTt
Pt+1
Pt
  1

pNTt+1y
NT
t+1
pNTt+1
pNTt
Pt+1
Pt
o
= 0
(97)
where pNTt  P
NT
t
Pt
and  
0
(:)  	
0
(:)
Pt
:
F Decentralized Equilibrium (in nominal terms)
The Decentralized Equilibrium is a set of 58 processes crt ; 
r
t ; l
H;r
t ; l
NT;r
t ; l
P;r
t ; k
H;r
t 1; k
NT;r
t 1 ; f
r
t ; c
nr
t ; 
nr
t ;
lH;nrt ; l
NT;nr
t ; l
P;nr
t ; l
H;i
t ; l
NT;j
t ; l
g
t y
H
t ; 	
H0
t ; !
H
t ; r
H;k
t ; w
H
t ; y
NT
t ; 	
NT 0
t ; !
NT
t ; r
NT;k
t ; w
NT
t ; k
g
t ; y
g
t ; w
P
t ; dt;  t;
yt; y
T
t ; y
H;d
t ; y
F
t ; y
gdp
t ; Qt; Rt; P
H
t ; P
NT
t ; P
T
t ; Pt; P
F
t ; x
H
t ; x
NT
t ; xt; tott,g
c
t ; g
i
t; g
w
t ; 
l
t; s
g;c
t ; s
g;i
t ; s
w
t ; s
l
t; 
c
t ; 
k
t ;
nt satisfying the following 58 equations, given the exogenous variables P

t ; A
H
t ; A
NT
t ; A
g
t and
St
St 1
and initial
conditions for the state variables. :
@Urt
@crt
= rt (1 + 
c
t) (F.1.)
  @U
r
t
@lH;rt
= rt (1  nt )wHt (F.2.)
  @U
r
t
@lNT;rt
= rt (1  nt )wNTt (F.3.)
  @U
r
t
@lP;rt
= rt (1  nt )wPt (F.4.)
rt

1 +
@(kHt ;k
H
t 1)
@kHt

=
E0
r
t+1

1  H +  1  kt+1 rH;kt+1   @(kHt+1;kHt )@kHt
 (F.5.)
rt

1 +
@NT (kNTt ;k
NT
t 1)
@kTt

=
E0
r
t+1

1  NT +  1  kt+1 rNT;kt+1   @NT (kNTt+1;kNTt )@kNTt
 (F.6.)
rt = E0
r
t+1Rt
Pt
Pt+1
(F.7.)
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rt

StP

t
Pt
+
@(frt ;f
r)
@frt

=
E0Qt
r
t+1
St+1P

t+1
Pt+1
Pt
Pt+1
(F.8.)
@Unrt
@cnrt
= nrt (1 + 
c
t) (F.9.)
  @U
nr
t
@lH;nrt
= nrt (1  nt )wHt (F.10.)
  @U
nr
t
@lNT;nrt
= nrt (1  nt )wNTt (F.11.)
  @U
r
t
@lP;rt
= nrt (1  nt )wPt (F.12.)
(1 +  ct)Ptc
nr
t = (1  nt )Pt

wHt l
H;nr
t + w
NT
t l
NT;nr
t + w
P
t l
P;nr
t

  Pt l;nrt (F.13.)
yt =

(v)
1

 
yTt
  1
 + (1  v) 1  yNTt   1   1 (F.14.)
yTt =
v
1  v

PTt
PNTt
 
yNTt (F.15.)
Pt =
h
v
 
PTt
1 
+ (1  v)  PNTt 1 i 11  (F.16.)
yTt =
" 
vH
 1
H

yH;dt
 H 1
H
+
 
1  vH 1H  yFt  H 1H
# H
H 1
(F.17.)
yH;dt =
vH
1  vH

PHt
PFt
 H
yFt (F.18.)
PTt =

vH
 
PHt
1 H
+
 
1  vH  PFt 1 H 11 H (F.19.)
PFt = StP

t (F.20.)
yNT;it = A
NT
t fygt g{
NT
1

kNT;it 1
aNT 
lNT;it
1 aNT{NT2
(F.21.)
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Ptr
k
t = 	
NT 0
t a
NT{NT2
yNT;it
kNT;it 1
(F.22.)
Ptw
NT
t = 	
NT 0
t
 
1  aNT {NT2 yNTt
lNT;it
(F.23.)
Pt
N i
N
!NT;it = P
NT;i
t
N i
N
yNT;it   Ptrkt
N i
N
kNT;it 1   PtwNTt
N i
N
lNT;it (F.24.)
n 
1  "NT  pNTt yNTt + "NT 0NT yNTt o
 NT

pNTt
pNTt 1
Pt
Pt 1
  1

pNTt y
NT
t
pNTt
pNTt 1
Pt
Pt 1
+ 
rt+1
rt+1
Pt
Pt+1
n
NT

PNTt+1
PNTt
Pt+1
Pt
  1

PNTt+1 y
NT
t+1
PNTt+1
PNTt
Pt+1
Pt
o
= 0
(F.25.)
yH;jt = A
H
t fygt g{
H
1

kH;jt 1
aH 
lH;jt
1 aH{H2
(F.26.)
Ptr
H;k
t = 	
H0
t a
H{H2
yH;jt
Nj
N k
H;j
t 1
(F.27.)
Ptw
H
t = 	
H0
t
 
1  aH{H2 yHtNj
N l
H;j
t
(F.28.)
Pt
N j
N
!H;jt = P
H
t
N j
N
yH;jt   PtrH;kt
N j
N
kH;jt 1   PtwHt
N j
N
lH;jt (F.29.)
n 
1  "H pHt yHt + "H 0HyHt o
 H

pHt
pHt 1
Pt
Pt 1
  1

pHt y
H
t
pHt
pHt 1
Pt
Pt 1
+ 
rt+1
rt+1
Pt
Pt+1
n
H

PHt+1
PHt
Pt+1
Pt
  1

PHt+1y
H
t+1
PHt+1
PHt
Pt+1
Pt
o
= 0
(F.30.)
Ptdt = Rt 1gdt 1 +Qt 1
St
St 1
(1  g)Pt 1dt 1 + Ptgct + Ptgit + Ptgwt   Pt l;rt   Pt l;nrt   Pt t (F.31.)
Pt t   ctPt
 
Nr
N c
r
t +
Nnr
N c
nr
t

+ nt
Nr
N

wHt l
H;r
t + w
NT
t l
NT;r
t + w
P
t l
P;r
t

+nt
Nnr
N

wHt l
H;nr
t + w
NT
t l
NT;nr
t + +w
P
t l
P;nr
t

+ kt
Nr
N

rH;kt k
H;r
t 1 + e!H;rt + rNT;kt kNT;rt 1 + e!NT;rt  (F.32.)
kgt = (1  g) kgt 1 + git (F.33.)
ygt = A
g
t
 
kgt 1
ag1 (lgt )ag2 (gct )1 ag1 ag2 (F.34.)
Ptyt = Pt
Nr
N

crt + x
H;r
t + x
NT;r
t

+ Pt
Nnr
N
cnrt + Ptg
c
t + Ptg
i
t (F.35.)
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yHt = y
H;d
t + xt (F.36.)
N i
N
lH;it =
Nr
N
lH;rt +
Nnr
N
lH;nrt (F.37.)
N j
N
lNT;jt =
Nr
N
lNT;rt +
Nnr
N
lNT;nrt (F.38.)
lgt =
Nr
N
lP;rt +
Nnr
N
lP;nrt (F.39.)
(1  g)Ptdt   StP

t
Pt
Nr
N f
r
t = Qt 1
St
St 1
(1  g)Pt 1dt 1  Qt 1 StSt 1St 1P t 1N
r
N f
r
t 1
+PFt y
F
t   PHt xt + 
NT
2

PNTt
PNTt 1
  1
2
PNTt y
NT
t +
H
2

PHt
PHt 1
  1
2
PHt y
H
t + 
 (ft ; f
)
(F.40.)
kH;rt =

1  H

kH;rt 1 + x
H;r
t   H

kH;rt ; k
H;r
t 1

(F.41.)
kNT;rt =

1  NT

kNT;rt 1 + x
NT;r
t   NT

kNT;rt ; k
NT;r
t 1

(F.42.)
Pty
gdp
t = P
H
t y
H
t + P
NT
t y
NT
t + Ptg
w
t (F.43.)
Qt = Q

t +  
d

e
Ptdt
Pty
gdp
t
 D   1

+ e"
q
t 1   1 (F.44.)
tott =
PHt
PFt
(F.45.)
xt = 
xxt 1 + (1  x)

tott
tot
 x
(F.46.)
Ptg
w
t = N
rPtw
P
t l
P;r
t +N
nrPtw
P
t l
P;nr
t (F.47.)
sg;ct =
gg;ct
ygdpt
(F.48.)
sg;it =
gg;it
ygdpt
(F.49.)
swt =
gwt
ygdpt
(F.50.)
slt =
 lt
ygdpt
(F.51.)
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sg;ct   sg;c = g;c
 
sg;ct 1   sg;c
  g;c dt
ygdpt
  d
ygdp
!
+ "g;ct (F.52.)
sg;it   sg;i = g;i

sg;it 1   sg;i

  g;i
 
dt
ygdpt
  d
ygdp
!
+ "g;it (F.53.)
swt   sw = w
 
swt 1   sw
  w dt
ygdpt
  d
ygdp
!
+ "wt (F.54.)
slt   sl = l
 
slt 1   sl
  l dt
ygdpt
  d
ygdp
!
+ "lt (F.55.)
 ct    c = c
 
 ct 1    c

+ c
 
dt
ygdpt
  d
ygdp
!
+ "ct (F.56.)
kt   k = k
 
kt 1   k

+ k
 
dt
ygdpt
  d
ygdp
!
+ "kt (F.57.)
nt   n = n
 
nt 1   n

+ n
 
dt
ygdpt
  d
ygdp
!
+ "nt (F.58.)
G Functional forms
We assume the following utility function for both types of households r; nr:
Ur
 
ct; l
T
t ; l
NT
t ; y
g
t

=
(ct + #
ggct)
1 
1     
H
 
lHt
1+H
1 + H
  NT
 
lNTt
1+NT
1 + NT
  P
 
lPt
1+P
1 + P
(98)
@Ut
@ct
= (ct + #
ggct)
  (99)
@Ut
@lt
= j

ljt
j
(100)
where j = H;NT; P: Adjustment costs take the form:
j

kjt ; k
j
t 1

=
j
2
 
kjt
kjt 1
  1
!2
kjt 1 (101)
@j

kjt ; k
j
t 1

@kjt
= j
 
kjt
kjt 1
  1
!
(102)
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@j

kjt+1; k
j
t

@kjt
=
j
2
 
kjt+1
kjt
  1
!2
  j
 
kjt+1
kjt
  1
! 
kjt+1
kjt
!
(103)
where j = H;NT; and
 (frt ) =

2
 
pFt f
r
t   pF fr
2
(104)
@ (frt )
@frt
= 
 
pFt f
r
t   pF fr

(105)
Below we simplify the DE system, in doing so we subsititute out the following equilibrium conditions:
N i
N
kH;it =
Nr
N
kH;rt
N j
N
kNT;jt =
Nr
N
kNT;rt
yNTt 
Y NTt
N
=
N iyNT;it
N
yHt 
Y Ht
N
=
N jyH;jt
N
Finally, we express the vector of prices fPt; PTt ; PFt ; PHt ; PNTt g in terms of nal good price, Pt; i.e., pTt  P
T
t
Pt
;
pFt  P
F
t
Pt
=
StP

t
Pt
; pHt  P
H
t
Pt
; pNTt  P
NT
t
Pt
and ination rate is dened as t  PtPt 1 . Also, we dene
r  NrN ,nr  N
nr
N ; while, without loss of generality we assume N
i = N:
H Decentralized Equilibrium (in real terms)
(crt + #
ggct)
 
= rt (1 + 
c
t) (H.1.)
H

lH;rt
H
= rt (1  nt )wHt (H.2.)
NT

lNT;rt
NT
= rt (1  nt )wNTt (H.3.)
P

lP;rt
P
= rt (1  nt )wPt (H.4.)
rt

1 + H

kH;rt
kH;rt 1
  1

=
E0
r
t+1
 
1  H +  1  kt+1 rH;kt+1   2 kH;rt+1kH;rt   1
2
+ 

kH;rt+1
kH;rt
  1

kH;rt+1
kH;rt
! (H.5.)
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rt

1 + H

kH;rt
kH;rt 1
  1

=
E0
r
t+1
 
1  NT +  1  kt+1 rNT;kt+1   2 kNT;rt+1kNT;rt   1
2
+ 

kNT;rt+1
kNT;rt
  1

kNT;rt+1
kNT;rt
! (H.6.)
rt = E0
r
t+1
1
t+1
(H.7.)
rt
 
pFt + 
  pFt frt   pF fr =
E0
r
t+1Qtp
F
t
1
t+1
(H.8.)
(cnrt + #
ggct)
 
= nrt (1 + 
c
t) (H.9.)
H

lH;nrt
H
= nrt (1  nt )wHt (H.10.)
NT

lNT;nrt
NT
= nrt (1  nt )wNTt (H.11.)
P

lP;nrt
P
= nrt (1  nt )wPt (H.12.)
(1 +  ct) c
nr
t = (1  nt )

wHt l
H;nr
t + w
NT
t l
NT;nr
t + w
P
t l
P;nr
t

   l;nrt (H.13.)
yt =

(v)
1

 
yTt
  1
 + (1  v) 1  yNTt   1   1 (H.14.)
yTt =
v
1  v

pTt
pNTt
 
yNTt (H.15.)
1 =
h
v
 
pTt
1 
+ (1  v)  pNTt 1 i 11  (H.16.)
yTt =
" 
vH
 1
H

yH;dt
 H 1
H
+
 
1  vH 1H  yFt  H 1H
# H
H 1
(H.17.)
yH;dt =
vH
1  vH

pHt
pFt
 H
yFt (H.18.)
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pTt =

vH
 
pHt
1 H
+
 
1  vH  pFt 1 H 11 H (H.19.)
pFt
pFt 1
=
St
St 1
t
t
(H.20.)
yNTt = A
NT
t fygt g{
NT
1
 
rkNTt 1
aNT 
lNT;it
1 aNT{NT2
(H.21.)
rkt = mc
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I Construction of capital stock series
Following Conesa et al. (2007) and Gogos et al. (2014), we construct time series for the sectoral capital stocks,
i.e. tradable and non-tradable, and public capital stock. Let us start with the construction of time series for
capital stock in the tradable sector. To do this, we employ the law of motion of tradable physical capital:
kHt =

1  H

kHt 1 + x
H
t (106)
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Having Irish data on real investment, xHt ; (i.e. gross xed capital formation in the tradable sector) we
construct time series for physical capital stock, kHt ; by solving for a constant value of the depreciation rate,
H ; and an inital value for the physical capital stock, kH0 in the tradable sector: The value of 
H is chosen to
be consistent with the average consumption of xed capital in the tradable sector to GDP ratio observed in
Irish data over 1995-2014. We have data only for total consumption of xed capital which averages to 0.11207
as a share of GDP. Thus, to approximate the share of consumption of xed capital in the tradable sector to
total consumption of xed capital we use the share of gross xed capital formation in the tradable sector to
gross xed capital in both sectors which is equal to 34% over 1995-2014. Thus the average of consumption of
xed capital in the tradable sector as a share of GDP for 1995-2014 is written:
1
19
2014X
t=1995
HkHt
ygdpt
= 0:038 (107)
The initial capital stock, kH0 ; is chosen so that the capital-to-output ratio matches the average ratio over
1995-2014, which yields the following equation:
kH1995
ygdp1995
=
1
19
2014X
t=1995
kHt
ygdpt
(108)
Thus we end up with 21 unknowns, H ; kH1995; k
H
1996;..., k
H
2014 in 21 equations, i.e. equation (106) for t =
1996; ::; 2014; and equations (107) and (108). The solution of this system results in a time series for tradable
capital stock, kH1995; k
H
1996;..., k
H
2014 and a calibrated value for the depreciation rate, 
H = 0:071:
Similarly we construct the time series for the capital stock in the non-tradable sector. We employ the law
of motion of physical capital:
kNTt =

1  NT

kNTt 1 + x
NT
t (109)
As before we use data for real investment in the non-tradable sector, xNTt ; i.e. gross xed capital formation
in the non-tradable sector:We assume a constant depreciation rate, NT ; which is consistent with the average
consumption of xed capital in the non-tradable sector to GDP ratio over 1995-2014. As before to extract
this ratio from total consumption of xed capital we assume that the ratio related to non-tradable sector is
equal to the average ratio of gross xed capital in the non-tradable sector to gross xed capital in both sectors
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which is equal to 66%. This gives us the following equation for the average of consumption of xed capital in
the non-tradable sector as a share of GDP for 1995-2014:
1
19
2014X
t=1995
NT kNTt
ygdpt
= 0:074 (110)
The initial capital stock, kNT0 ; is chosen so that the capital-to-output ratio matches the average ratio over
1996-2014, which yields the following equation:
kNT1995
ygdp1995
=
1
19
2014X
t=1995
kNTt
ygdpt
(111)
Thus we end up with 21 unknowns, NT ; kNT1995; k
NT
1996;..., k
NT
2014 in 21 equations, i.e. equation (109) for t =
1996; ::; 2014 and equations (110) and (111). The solution of this system results in a time series for non-tradable
capital stock, kNT1995; k
NT
1996;..., k
NT
2014 and a calibrated value for the depreciation rate, 
NT = 0:051:
Finally, we construct a time series for public capital stock following the same methodology (as in Papa-
georgiou (2014)). Using the law of motion of public capital, data for government consumption of xed capital
and gross government xed capital formation we obtain the following equations:
kgt = (1  g) kgt 1 + git (112)
1
19
2014X
t=1995
gkgt
ygdpt
= 0:01767 (113)
kg1995
ygdp1995
=
1
19
2014X
t=1995
kgt
ygdpt
(114)
Similarly, we end up with 21 unknowns, g; kg1995; k
g
1996;..., k
g
2014 in 21 equations, i.e. equation (112) for
t = 1996; ::; 2014 and equations (113) and (114). The solution of this system results in a time series for public
capital stock, kg1995; k
g
1996;..., k
g
2014 and a calibrated value for the depreciation rate, 
g = 0:0741:
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J Data and sources
Table: Data and Soucres
Description Source
Gross Domestic Product ESRI Database/CSO
Nominal interest rate on Irish government bonds Eurostat
Nominal interest rate on German government bonds Eurostat
HICP (2015=100) Ireland Eurostat
HICP (2015=100) Germany Eurostat
Real Interest rate Ireland Own calculations
Real Interest rate Germany Own calculations
Nominal Gross Value Added in the (private) non-tradable sector ESRI Database/CSO
Nominal Gross Value Added in the tradable sector ESRI Database/CSO
Exports in value added OECD-TiVA
Remuneration of employees in the tradable sector ESRI Database/CSO
Remuneration of employees in the non-tradable sector ESRI Database/CSO
Productive gross xed capital formation in the tradable sector ESRI Database/CSO
Productive gross xed capital formation in the tradable sector ESRI Database/CSO
Private consumption of goods and services ESRI Database/CSO
Government consumption Eurostat
Government Investment Eurostat
Public transfers Eurostat
Public wages Eurostat
Consumption tax Kostarakos & Varthalitis (2019)
Capital tax Kostarakos & Varthalitis (2019)
Labour tax Kostarakos & Varthalitis (2019)
Public debt to GDP ratio Eurostat
Trade balance to GDP ratio Eurostat
Consumption of xed capital-total economy Eurostat
Consumption of xed capital-Private Sector Eurostat
GDP Deator Eurostat
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